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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2017, an obscure U.N. official by the name of Dainius Puras—
acting in his capacity as “Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”—
sent a remarkable letter to the Trump Administration via the representative of
the United States’ permanent mission in Geneva, Switzerland.1 Puras had
learned of the Administration’s plans to encourage Congress to repeal core
elements of the Affordable Care Act (popularly known as “ObamaCare”), and
he wished to alert Congress to the fact that such repeal would violate
international law. How precisely would it do that? Simple: Repeal would
violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 which allegedly is an
“expression of international customary law” binding on all states, including
the United States.3 Repeal would also violate the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,4 which the United States allegedly is
bound to uphold even though it is not a state party but merely a signatory.5
Puras urged the Trump Administration to put in place “all necessary interim
measures” to prevent the purported rights violations,6 and advised of his
intention to go public with his concerns owing to their felt urgency. 7
It would be easy to laugh this letter off as just another hubristic twitch on
the part of a minor U.N. bureaucrat – and one not even legally trained at that.8
Puras’s claims should have struck any lawyer versed in the secondary rules of
international law formation as highly contestable. Yet I would argue that not
only should we not laugh too soon at Puras; we should not laugh at all. For
his foray deep into the heart of American politics was not the isolated and
aberrant adventure it may have seemed at the time. A mere ten months later,
1 See Letter from Dainius Puras to Theodore Allegra (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washi
ngtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2017/04/25/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/103
_17_ACA_Repeal_Request_for_Information.pdf?tid=a_inl_manual [hereinafter Puras
Letter].
2 G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
3 Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 3.
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
5 See Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 3.
6 Id. at 4.
7 See id. at 5.
8 Puras is a doctor, with no discernible legal training. See Dana Milbank, Apparently
Repealing Obamacare Could Violate International Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2017), http
s://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/apparently-repealing-obamacare-could-violate-int
ernational-law/2017/04/25/2794a77c-29f4-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html?utm_ter
m=.d8f26ce294eb.
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no less esteemed an international lawyer than Philip Alston visited the United
States in his role as “UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights” and made similar problematic claims about the sources of
international legal obligation, this time in a not-so-subtle bid to get the Trump
Administration to back away from its tax-reform agenda.9 Alston’s public
statement, issued in December 2017 after a two-week “poverty tour” of the
United States, reads in pertinent part:
Successive administrations, including the present one, have
determinedly rejected the idea that economic and social rights
are full-fledged human rights, despite their clear recognition
not only in key treaties that the US has ratified (such as the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination), and in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which the US has long insisted other countries must
respect. But denial does not eliminate responsibility, nor does
it negate obligations. International human rights law
recognizes a right to education, a right to healthcare, a right to
social protection for those in need, and a right to an adequate
standard of living. In practice, the United States is alone
among developed countries in insisting that while human
rights are of fundamental importance, they do not include
rights that guard against dying of hunger, dying from a lack of
access to affordable healthcare, or growing up in a context of
total deprivation.10
Alston’s tone was matter-of-fact to the point of being blasé. However, the
substance of his statements and suggestions should have turned heads–and not
in a good way. Is it really the case that a state’s determined denial of an
obligation fails to relieve it of responsibility to fulfil that obligation under
international law? Or that formally non-binding and aspirational resolutions
passed in the U.N. General Assembly impose duties that states may neither
ignore nor honor in the breach? Or that non-conforming state practice is to be
regarded as irresponsible state self-ostracism from the international
community rather than legitimate self-protection from it? Surely given his
prior scholarship in the area of sources of international law Alston would

9 See Jake Johnson, UN Report Condemns Trump Admin for ‘Deliberately’ Creating
Devastating Inequality, ZEROHEDGE (June 4, 2018), https://www.zerohedge.com/news/
2018-06-04/un-report-condemns-trump-admin-deliberately-creating-devastating-inequalit
y.
10 Statement on Visit to the USA, by Professor Philip Alston, UNITED NATIONS HUM.
RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/P
ages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22533.
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know to give highly qualified answers to each of these questions. 11 And yet
there he was, sitting on the doorstep of a newly-minted Presidency, loudly
proclaiming the United States to be effectively an international outlaw, and
lamenting the fact that U.S. officials were not prepared to defer to legal and
political decisions made at the international level. An unnecessarily officious
exercise on Alston’s part? Perhaps.12 Yet in truth it was hardly surprising.
Whether Alston knew it or not, both he and Puras were taking a page out of a
very old playbook, one written twenty-five years earlier by American legal
scholar Jonathan Charney.13
The year was 1993. Charney looked out on the world and saw a set of
brewing and formidable crises. Problems that presented as global in nature—
climate change, international terrorism, and economic instability—seemed to
require global solutions, yet the Westphalian-based ideal of state sovereignty
was standing stubbornly in the way.14 The ability of any given state to dissent
from, and opt out of, a course of remedial action agreed to at the international
level was imperiling the achievement of crucial public goods on a worldwide
scale.15 Charney’s mission, as he saw it, was to find a way to steamroll the
dissenters.16 This would require, at the very least, circumventing the principle
of state consent as the basis of international legal obligation. Charney astutely
recognized a potentially useful tool of coercion in the doctrine of sources:
The secondary rules of recognition govern the process by
which rules of international law are established. . . . Thus, if
the secondary rules require unanimity before a primary rule
11 See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1992).
12 Alston’s invocation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination was a particularly cheap shot. 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter
CERD]. CERD does mention social and economic rights, but only for the purpose of
prohibiting discrimination relative to their exercise should they be recognized, not of
declaring them as such. The U.S. Senate that ratified the CERD clearly understood the
difference: “States are not required by [CERD] Article 5 to ensure observance of each of
the rights listed in that article, but rather to prohibit discrimination in the enjoyment of
those rights to the extent they are provided by the domestic law.” S. REP. NO. 103-29
(1994), at 28 [hereinafter Senate Report]. The Senate made this distinction against the
backdrop of both persistent legislative resistance to the ICESCR and settled law holding
that economic rights are not protected under any provision of the U.S. Constitution. For
background on these points, see Barbara Stark, At Last? Ratification of the Economic
Covenant as a Congressional-Executive Agreement, 20 TRANSNAT’ L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107 (2011).
13 Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993).
14 See id. at 529-30.
15 Id.
16 See id. at 531 (“In this article, I explore the limits of state autonomy to determine
whether some or all of international law may be made universally binding regardless of the
position of one or a small number of unwilling states.”).
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may enter into international law for all states, as a practical
matter, the possibility of universal rules will be foreclosed
unless the secondary rules are changed.17
And changed they have been. Over the course of the last twenty-five years,
international legal scholars—aided by sympathetic officials in
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs,
respectively)—have taken up Charney’s challenge of altering the doctrine of
sources to get the international community past that all-important point at
which “state sovereignty gives way to the legal and political supremacy of
global institutions.” 18 They have sought to evolve the old doctrine of sources
into a new one that redounds to international power structures and detracts
from national ones. In reality their task has been two-fold: (1) To secure
adjustments to the rules of international law-formation which make it easier
for international actors to bind dissenting states to their decisions as a matter
of international law; and (2) to secure adjustments to domestic rules of
international law internalization which make it harder for national actors to
ignore or act counter to international legal standards. The need for this second
prong of what I shall call the “Sources Project” will be readily apparent, as it
would make little sense (from a globalist’s perspective) to go to the trouble of
building a Cadillac of international law only to have to leave it idling out on
the road because one could not get it parked inside the domestic garage. Hence
the need for scholars like former Yale Law School dean (and senior State
Department official) Harold Koh, who has assiduously worked the domestic
level of the Sources Project for the last thirty years. In one of his most recent
bids to get the new international law “in,” Koh echoed Charney in warning
his colleagues that unless they abandon traditional constitutional doctrine
regarding presidential authority to conclude international agreements, the
international-law project will stall:
17 Id. at 533-34. Charney was by no means the first legal scholar to think along these
lines, though his formulation of the perceived challenge was arguably the most compact
and candid. Writing over ten years earlier, Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt had claimed
to see a similar inadequacy in an international system that lacked ways to bind states legally
to rules they opposed. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (1981). In 1986, Louis Sohn urged states “to adapt the
methods of law-creation to the needs of the rapidly growing and changing world
community.” Louis B. Sohn, ‘Generally Accepted’ International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1073, 1079 (1986). And in 1990, Theodor Meron cited “the enlightened interest of the
international community in extending the reach and in strengthening the effectiveness of
essential norms of international public order” in encouraging the International Court of
Justice to be bolder in its findings of customary norms. THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND HUMANITARIAN N ORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 114 (1991).
18 Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1266
(2005).
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As we move from diplomatic dialogue to political
commitments to soft regimes to shared norms to legal rules to
international institutions, we should not impose a formal
triptych on novel ways of negotiating international
arrangements, because such rules make such arrangements
nearly impossible to achieve.19
The sense of mission and sheer enthusiasm of the scholars who responded
positively to Charney’s challenge was evident early on. Writing in 1999, Paul
Stephan—one scholar who did not so respond—noted with alarm that:
[I]t seems surprising how infrequently the community of
international law scholars contemplates arguments against the
expansion of international law’s domain. . . . [T]o a far greater
extent than in other fields, academic specialists seem to accept
the fundamental desirability of the subject in which they are
expert and to believe that the world needs more international
law, not less.20
Indeed, so uncritically did the international lawyers of his day view the
expansion of international law’s empire that Stephan felt the need to admonish
them to “get beyond the simple equation of international law with progressive
development and invite the kind of wide-open inquiry that we have come to
take for granted elsewhere.” 21 Motivated by similar concerns, and writing just
a few years later, Kenneth Anderson suggested that the evidence of the
collapse of traditional state sovereignty was being “wildly exaggerated” in the
scholarly literature on global governance.22 Even the International Law
Commission (ILC)—a body not easily moved to gratuitous action—recently
felt the need to chide sources scholars for their tendency to forsake analysis
for advocacy.23
Equally palpable has been these scholars’ sense of their own power and
influence. Unlike their political scientist colleagues, globalist legal scholars
have long been aware that, courtesy of Article 38(d) of the Statute of the

19 Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century
International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. F. 338, 365 (2017).
20 Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority,
and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1586 (1999).
21 Id. at 1587.
22 Anderson, supra note 18, at 1300.
23 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary
International Law, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018) at Conclusion 14, cmt.
(3) [hereinafter Draft Conclusions]. Charney’s own 1993 article had a highly prescriptive
feel to it even though he claimed merely to be describing a newly emerging process of CILformation.
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International Court of Justice (ICJ),24 they do indeed have a formal seat at the
table when it comes to identifying the rules of international law, including the
identification of the secondary rules of recognition. In 2002, Ernest Young
went so far as to accuse certain scholars of harboring “delusions of grandeur”
in regard to their role in the formation and articulation of customary
international law (CIL) norms.25 Yet Young’s criticism, while understandable,
was arguably misplaced. As Stephan was quick to perceive, there was nothing
delusional about the scholars’ sense of power, for the power was very real.
Stephan saw it clearly at work in the pre-Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain26 debate
concerning the self-execution of the CIL of human rights, where the scholars
had helped to build a “great edifice” of doctrine out of two suggestive
Supreme Court cases.27 “Either human rights law will fulfil the ambitions of
its academic supporters through increasingly bold accomplishments,” Stephan
predicted in 2000, “or it will fall back . . . .”28 He left his readers with the
distinct impression that he thought the scholars would win.29
Having a sense of mission and of power, however, has not insulated
globalist scholars from criticism, nor assured them victory. They have indeed
faced opposition, albeit from a fairly small minority from within the academic
community. Writing in 1988, Arthur Weisburd took aim at Blum and
Steinhardt’s work and expressed sheer exasperation at the notion that one
might, via scholarly ipse dixit, alter the doctrine of sources to achieve a “world
order.”30 He specifically contested the then-blossoming view that CIL could
be derived almost automatically from any provision of a norm-creating
character of any treaty or convention.31 Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith all
but accused their fellow scholars of committing an intellectual coup d’etat by
inserting the so called Modern Position regarding the self-executing nature of
CIL under U.S. law into the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States.32 Stephan went so far as to suggest that American
scholars’ influence in CIL-formation “seem[ed] the antithesis of

24 Statue of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
25 Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA.
J. INT’L L. 365, 391 (2002).
26 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
27 Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 237, 241 (2000).
28 Id. at 242.
29 Id. at 246.
30 Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 42-45 (1988).
31 Id. at 23-30.
32 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 341-45 (1997) (recounting the
authors’ criticism of the origins of the Modern Position).
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democracy.”33 And passion seems to have begotten passion. On the globalists’
side, Koh has reacted to the nationalistic bent of the Trump Administration
with some highly unconventional proposals and calls-to-action that are
designed to keep the Sources Project moving forward at all cost. 34 The unusual
bitterness that has characterized some of these debates—with references to
“heated criticism,”35 “heated spats,” 36 “fierce arguments,” 37 “pitched and
occasionally intemperate debate,”38 “angry responses,” 39 “distorted”
accounts,”40 views put forward “without a sense of . . . intellectual history and
without any effort to explain [their] justifications,” 41 and “polarization” that
is “unhelpful and inaccurate” 42—is incomprehensible unless one realizes that
the more nationalistically minded scholars have not only been staking out
alternative positions of a technical, academic nature. These scholars have been
throwing wrenches into a well-oiled machine that at one point had been well
on its way to delivering a massive shift in power away from the most
democratically accountable institutions of the modern nation-state toward far
less accountable “others.”43
If one takes stock of the scholarly discourse as a whole, it is clear that a
quiet war has been raging around the Sources Project for some time. Bradley,
who has fought many intellectual battles for the nationalist camp, seemed to
sense as much when in a footnote to a 2007 article about unratified treaties he
noted that:
[t]he effort to increase the obligations on signatory nations can
be seen as part of a more general effort by advocacy groups,
international institutions, and some scholars to relax formal
and consent-based requirements for the imposition of
international obligations. Other examples might include a less
practice-based conception of customary international law,
restrictions on the ability of nations to opt out of customary
international law, concepts of jus cogens norms that are
Stephan, supra note 27, at 246.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
35 Stephan, supra note 27, at 242.
36 Young, supra note 25, at 366.
37 Stephan, supra note 27, at 237.
38 Id. at 241.
39 Young, supra note 25, at 367.
40 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 341.
41 Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE
L.J. 202, 206 (2010).
42 JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 282
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
43 As will be discussed infra Part II, these “others” comprise not only the almost wholly
unaccountable class of international actors but also the least accountable national ones, viz.
the judiciary and the bureaucracy.
33
34
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binding without regard to state consent, and severability of
purportedly invalid treaty reservations.44
However, while Bradley limned the contours of this “more general effort,”
neither he nor any other scholar has explored it with the scrutiny it deserves.
As he and Goldsmith acknowledged in their recent comprehensive study of
presidential power to shape U.S. commitments under international law, 45
sometimes only a broad canvassing of the many specific manifestations of a
phenomenon can give us a sense of what precisely is at stake—of what we
have lost, what we have saved, and what we may yet regain. This Article
aspires to be that broader chronicle. In Parts I and II, I undertake a mostly
descriptive survey of the main battles that have been fought on both the
international and domestic levels of the Sources Project. In doing so, I hope
not only to afford an appreciation of the ways in which globalist scholars have
sought to mobilize the doctrine of sources against the authority of the nationstate, but also to provide a more perceptive account than is currently available
of the current state of that doctrine. In Part III I explore an interesting
normative aspect of the Sources Project, viz. the key historical and theoretical
assumptions that seem to have legitimized the Project in the eyes of its
scholarly promoters.
My own opinion of the Sources Project will undoubtedly be clear from this
Article’s title. The word “corruption” is a strong word, far stronger than the
morally neutral “change” or even the negatively-connotative “manipulation.”
Like a small group of other international law scholars, I am a proudly
unreconstructed democratic-sovereigntist who believes the Sources Project is
flawed from a political-morality standpoint owing to the highly questionable
end that it serves, namely “globalization.” This overused term has different
meanings depending upon the context. Here I shall use it to denote the
diffusion of national political power upward toward trans-, supra- and
international organizations and authorities, often via the activities of the least
politically accountable elements of domestic officialdoms (viz. civil servants
and judges).46 I use the word “corruption” for the further reason that globalist
legal scholars have at times been so result-oriented in their approach to
sources that they have not always adhered to the standards of intellectual
honesty, consistency of principle, and restraint that we usually take for granted

44 Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution,
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 331 n.114 (2007).
45 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2018).
46 If judged by its fruits, globalization is the process by which “the residuum of authority
left in our national government seems an ever-diminishing domain.” Stephan, supra note
27, at 237. See also Stephan, supra note 20, at 1578 (“[I]ncreasingly the rules that shape
what [domestic actors] may or must do represent the choices of international organs rather
than national parliaments and bureaucracies”).
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in academic discourse.47 This is not to say, of course, that such scholars are
bad men and women. In fact, quite the opposite is true. More than anyone else,
they recall the civil-rights lawyers of the mid-twentieth century who
passionately tried to bring forth a better society based on a reinterpretation of
the secondary rules of the U.S. Constitution relating to the reach of the federal
government’s power over the states.48
Yet there are differences. The federal government whose power those
twentieth-century lawyers were seeking to vindicate was a reasonably
transparent and democratically-accountable one; the international governance
structure is not. Stephan noted the obvious in 1999 when he wrote that:
[t]he processes that generate the new international law are
several steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold
lawmakers accountable for their decisions. . . . To be sure,
accountability is not completely absent in the new
international law. . . . But, on the whole, the makers of the new
international law find it easier to avoid the consequences of
their decisions than do most national lawmakers.49
That, I submit, was putting it mildly. Writing a few years later, Rubenfeld
rightly refused to pull any punches:
There is, among international lawyers, a hazy notion that the
emergence of the international community in the world of law
and politics is itself a democratic development. The
unfortunate reality, however, is that international law is a
threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics all
over the world. For some, that may be a reason to support
internationalism; for others, a reason to oppose it. Either way,
the fundamental conflicts between democracy and
international law must be recognized.50
Another important difference between then and now is that the secondary
rules at issue in the civil rights era were reinterpreted not so much in order to
create new power as to reflect it. The federal government’s conclusive power
I shall call attention to such lapses as they present themselves.
This reach is most notable with the commerce power and the power to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment.
49 Stephan, supra note 20, at 1578-79.
50 Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, 27 WILSON Q. Autumn 2003, at 22, 34 (2003).
See also Amy Baker Benjamin, The Many Faces of Secrecy, 8 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV.
1, 43-48 (2017) (analyzing the international order’s transparency-deficit); Anderson, supra
note 18, passim (analyzing the international order’s democracy-deficit). I return to this
topic infra Part III.C.
47
48
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over the states originated in the crucible of the Civil War. A massive de facto
event—literal northern boots on the southern ground—eventually resulted,
many decades later, in substantial de jure innovation, not the other way
around. Holmes acknowledged as much when, in narrowly interpreting the
scope of the 10th Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states, he
observed:
It was enough for [the Framers of the Constitution] to realize
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a
century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. . . . We must consider what
this country has become in deciding what that amendment has
reserved.51
Contrast that order of events with Koh’s contemporary “high-stakes
gamble” (his term) to legitimize easier ways for the President to commit the
United States to international agreements—the goal of which, not the cause
of which, is the “transform[ation] [of] national identity.”52 In globalism’s case
a small cadre of rule-writers are seeking to transform an entire national
identity. Simply to describe such an effort is, I submit, to condemn it.
The bottom line is that for the past twenty-five years globalist legal
scholars have been embarked on a mission of dubious merit for which there
is little precedent. The story is not a pretty one, nor flattering of its would-be
protagonists. Thankfully its ending has yet to be written.
II. PART I: THE SOURCES PROJECT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
A. Retooling CIL to Cure the Mischief of Treaties and of Aspiration
i.

Charney’s Authoritarian, yet Transparent, CIL

Charney’s foundational article was based on a subtle act of misdirection.
He began his analysis of the then-existing doctrine of sources with two quick
paragraphs suggesting that the rules relating to treaty-making did not pose a
danger to globalization.53 The role of state consent in treaty-making, he
assured his readers, was “limited, at best.” 54 It was not until the final page of
his essay that Charney revealed his actual opinion, which was that treatymaking represented the biggest impediment to globalization precisely because

51
52
53
54

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (emphasis added).
Koh, supra note 19, at 365.
See Charney, supra note 13, at 534-35.
Id. at 534.
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of its sovereignty-protecting attributes.55 His reasoning was candid and highly
revealing:
Much of the demand for international law has been filled by
treaties accepted as binding by state parties. Treaties, however,
are unable to serve all the international legal requirements of
the contemporary world. Treaties often require considerable
time to be negotiated, adopted and brought into force. It is also
impracticable to have treaties on all subjects of international
law. Most importantly, states’ adherence to treaties rarely
approaches universal participation. Domestic law usually
requires complex formal acts before treaties are accepted as
binding. In contrast, general international law [i.e. CIL] may
be established on the basis of less formal indications of consent
or acquiescence. This makes worldwide law possible; it cannot
be done through treaties alone.56
Charney was right. Treaty-making as it was then understood and practiced
was too grounded in state consent to be of use to globalists.57 Indeed, the entire
treaty-making process was rife with opportunities for states to withhold their
consent from proposed international rules and thereby avoid being bound.
States could refuse to sign treaties either out of dislike of substantive treaty
provisions or of the treaty form itself.58 If they signed, they could refuse to
ratify. If they ratified, they could interpose reservations, understandings, or
declarations (RUDS) that tailored the treaty to their own special needs and
concerns. Provided their constitutional processes were dualist in nature, they
could decline to implement a ratified treaty. Finally, even if they signed,
ratified, and implemented a treaty, they could successfully withdraw from it
at a later date if they changed their mind in most instances. For a globalist
legal scholar trying to build a non-consensual body of international law,
treaties and their various flexibility mechanisms posed nothing but
headaches.59 CIL, on the other hand, not only rested on “less formal
See id. at 551.
Id. at 551.
57 As I discuss infra Part I.B, globalists have recently implemented a range of strategies,
internal to the treaty form and/or its application, that are designed to diminish the
consensual nature of treaty commitments.
58 Some states, for example, opposed adopting the document that became the UDHR in
binding treaty form. See Hilary Charlesworth, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 7 (2008), https://
opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e887.
59 Accord Mario Prost, Hierarchy and the Sources of International Law, 39 HOUST. J.
INT’L L. 285, 303-04 (2017). Prost writes:
[T]he notion of non-consensual law-making has always appealed to
scholars committed to the ideal of universal law and frustrated with the
55
56
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indications of consent or acquiescence;” it was admirably self-executing even
in many otherwise dualist states.60 It also denied states a right of unilateral
exit post-crystallization.61 Charney saw in CIL an appealing alternative to
treaty-making precisely because of its coercive potential. His attitude
represented an abandonment of the early post-war academic enthusiasm for
treaties (and, indeed, for nationalism) as the preferred vehicles for delivering
improvements in the human condition.62
But before CIL could step into its new role, it would need a new doctrinal
look, and this new look would require some justification. Here again Charney
resorted to misdirection. He first tried to convince his readers that the need for
a CIL retooling was grounded in genuine concerns over transparency and
sovereignty.63 The presumption that state silence during the period of CIL
norm-gestation equalled knowing and voluntary consent, he cautioned,
masked “the reality that many states do not know that the law is being made
and thus have not formed an opinion.”64 Yet if Charney had been genuinely
strict contractual nature of treaties and the limits inherent in voluntary
law-making. . . . Many scholars have highlighted what they see as the
inherent inadequacy of treaty law and its emphasis on state consent in
dealing with global public good challenges . . . . In this context, treatymaking becomes problematic as it gives any state the right to object to
the formation of any proposed rule of international law.
For a fairly recent example of scholars’ and activists’ displeasure with treaties, see Monica
Hakimi, Custom’s Method and Process: Lessons from Humanitarian Law, in CUSTOM’S
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 148, 155 (Curtis A. Bradley ed.,
2016) (describing how the lack of universal ratification of the Additional Protocols to the
1949 Geneva Conventions became “untenable” with the maturation of international human
rights law and required rectification by an “ambitious” customary international
humanitarian law project).
60 Including, to some extent, the pre-Sosa United States. See infra Part II.A.
61 Bradley and Gulati label as the “Mandatory View” the conventional wisdom that once
a CIL rule becomes established, nations never have the unilateral right to withdraw from
it. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 204-05. Their research indicates that the
Mandatory View emerged during the years 1890-1920 at the instigation of Western states
concerned to ensure that emerging non-Western states would not be able to opt out of the
customary rules that had been developed during the centuries of European imperial rule.
See id. at 226-31.
62 See Prost, supra note 59, at 305-06 (noting this enthusiasm among Third World
scholars in particular). Charney was by no means alone. Writing in 1998, Charlesworth
confirmed that “[m]any jurists regard custom as a useful mechanism that can compensate
for the rigidity of treaty law, and have argued for the expansion of the category.” Hilary
Charlesworth, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law, 92 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 44, 44 (1998). For a more recent confirmation of this attitude, see Timothy
Meyer, Collective Decision-Making in International Governance, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 30,
34 (2014).
63 Charney, supra note 13, at 537.
64 Id.; see also id. at 538. Charney writes:
For political purposes . . . it may be desirable to engage in the fiction that
failure to object constitutes consent or acquiescence. In fact, law is made
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concerned to secure for states meaningful opportunities to express their
consent to the rules that would bind them, he presumably would not have been
trying to marginalize treaty-making as a source of international law. It was
not until deep within his article that Charney disclosed his real reason for
advocating a “new look” CIL, via these few quick remarks:
Traditional textbook accounts of customary international
lawmaking describe an amorphous process in which a pattern
of behaviour developed by states acting in their self-interest
over a long period of time is coupled with opinions that the
practice reflects a legal obligation (opinio juris). . . .
Traditional customary law formation may have sufficed when
both the scope of international law and the number of states
were limited. Today, however, the subject matter has
expanded substantially into areas that were traditionally the
preserve of states’ domestic jurisdiction. In addition, the
number of states has dramatically increased, together with
their diversity. The relatively exclusive ways of the past are
not suitable for contemporary circumstances.65
Translation: In a world of economically and culturally diverse states, no
significant CIL rules were likely to emerge as long as CIL-formation remained
rooted in the physical (and self-interested) practices of states.66 The real
problem with traditional CIL for Charney was therefore not its claimed
authoritarian nature, but just the opposite. Given the inductive methodology
by which it was assessed, traditional CIL could not help but reflect, to a large
if imperfect extent, the very needs, wishes, and judgments of states that
Charney thought were preventing the global community from dealing with
urgent global problems and concerns. A universal law of human rights would
without the conscious acceptance of most states. Traditionally,
customary law has been made by a few interested states for all.
Id. This type of criticism of traditional CIL has appeared almost as a matter of course in
the works of globalist scholars. For a small but representative sampling over the past
twenty-five years, see GREEN, supra note 42, at 248-49; Andrew T. Guzman, Saving
Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 141-44 (2005); Anthea Roberts,
Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation,
95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 767 (2001). Its purpose has generally not been to lay the
groundwork for sovereignty-protecting reforms but, somewhat perversely, to make the
scholars’ sovereignty-limiting proposals seem less threatening. Roberts’s own proposal
was to enlist certain philosophical ideas of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin as tie-breakers
in cases of ambiguous physical state practice.
65 Charney, supra note 13, at 543.
66 Cf. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 244 (noting that “wide variations in ethnicity,
culture, politics, resources, and economics” across the world’s 192 nations “make it less
likely that the aggregation of state practice, which is the basis for traditional CIL-formation,
will generate efficient rules”) (citation omitted).
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be particularly difficult to forge on the back of the traditional practice-based
CIL, in part because it was “still customary for a depressingly large number
of States to trample upon the human rights of their nationals,”67 but also
because the content and scope of human rights was (and to a significant extent
remains) contestable.68
Given that, for his purposes, Charney needed a more authoritarian version
of CIL-formation than existed at the time, the substance of his proposal for a
new type of CIL was hardly surprising. A “newly evolving process” 69 of CILformation was emerging, Charney announced, one rooted in the work-product
of IGOs, regional organizations, and multilateral diplomatic conferences
instead of in the physical practice of states.70 These fora would consider norms
presented in many different types of procedural dress (e.g. “proposals, reports,
resolutions, treaties or protocols” 71). What was important was not the
“technical legal status of the form in which [solutions] emerged from the
multilateral forum,”72 but the clarity of “the intention to promote a norm of
generally applicable international law” 73 and the strength of “the consensus
in favor of the norm.” 74 Eminent scholars would be on hand to assess fora
debates with a keen eye and a sensitive touch to determine whether a norm
had definitively emerged.75 Most importantly, dissenting states—which
Charney invariably chose to describe pejoratively (viz. “obstinate,” 76
“recalcitrant” 77)—could be outvoted with prejudice.78
Charney did not acknowledge the disenfranchisement that the world’s
citizenries were likely to suffer as a result of the ascendancy of this new
authoritarian CIL. Owing to its relatively slow formation, as well as its roots
Charney, supra note 13, at 551.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 50, at 30 (“The American view holds that democratic
nations can sometimes differ on matters of fundamental rights.”). Space for reasonable
disagreement and alternative regulatory approaches would seem to exist, at a minimum,
apropos the issues of hate speech, abortion, the death penalty, gun control, and human
migration.
69 Charney, supra note 13, at 551.
70 Id. at 543-44.
71 Id. at 544.
72 Id. at 545.
73 Id. at 546.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 545 n.62-63 (noting that “[s]ensitive analyses of the results produced by
such forums are necessary” and appearing to endorse Antonio Cassese for the position of
norm-caller-in-chief).
76 Id. at 551.
77 Id. at 529.
78 See id. at 544 (“[O]pposition by a small number of participating states may not stop
the movement of the proposed rule toward law.”); id. at 545 (suggesting that the objections
of “relatively isolated states” could be overridden); id. at 550 (“If universality is chosen,
notwithstanding the objections of a small minority, it will be only after all interests have
been considered . . . .”).
67
68
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in a physical state practice that usually involved more than just a handful of
appointed officials, traditional CIL was arguably far more visible to the
attentive portion of a national demos—and thus more subject to its scrutiny
and criticism—than Charney’s new CIL could ever hope to be. Indeed, how
could any citizenry hope to preserve an ex ante voice in a system of “rapid”
CIL-formation in which “one clearly phrased and strongly endorsed
declaration at a near-universal diplomatic forum could be sufficient to
establish new international law”?79 His silence on this point was perhaps to be
expected: the word “democracy” did not appear a single time in his article,
not even in the few brief sentences he devoted to discussing the merits of
sovereignty,80 and he seems to have been little troubled by the concept.
Charney did, however, keenly appreciate the level of opposition his proposals
were likely to meet from national governments,81 and he sought to reassure
them in a variety of ways.
First, by describing potential dissenting states as obstinate and
recalcitrant,82 Charney conveyed a high level of confidence in the substantive
normativity of the CIL that would emerge from the new process. The
possibility of good-faith dissent—of disagreeing and opposing because the
nominated way forward on any given issue is subject to reasonable criticism—
did not seem to occur to him.83 Second, he noted that rulemaking by majority
vote already existed in certain IGOs and rhetorically asked why it should not

79 Id. at 546-47. Sovereignty-minded scholars had little difficulty seeing the democratic
deficit inherent in Charney’s new CIL. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 V A. J. INT’L L. 449, 519 (2000) (“[T]he majority of
nations and peoples of the world rarely participate in the creation of customary rules that
limit their policy choices and sovereignty”); Stephan, supra note 27, at 238 (describing the
new CIL as “a prefabricated system of rules and norms constructed by a loose alliance of
like-minded academics and international law specialists through a form of advocacy that
involves no democratic checks”).
80 See Charney, supra note 13, at 530.
81 See id. at 550 (“Government officials are jealous of their state’s sovereignty and
autonomy and are loathe to adopt rules that bind dissenters. For they know that at some
point their state may be on the dissenting side of an issue.”) (citation omitted).
82 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
83 Nor has it occurred to many globalist scholars writing in his wake. Charlesworth, for
example, felt comfortable asserting without argument in 1998 that a positivistic
international system catering to the self-interests of sovereign states “leads us to an
unbearably light, bleak, ethically unsatisfying dead end.” Charlesworth, supra note 62, at
46. Several years later, her protégé, Anthea Roberts, noted with no apparent qualms that:
[t]he international community discounts the importance of dissenting
states and contrary state practice because it is not prepared to recognize
exceptions to the maintenance of certain fundamental values. . . . The
substantive normativity of modern custom can therefore be used to
justify a reduced focus on procedural normativity and descriptive
accuracy.
Roberts, supra note 64, at 766.
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also exist for CIL.84 Third, by misrepresenting the role state consent played
generally within the international system, Charney sought to mute the
revolutionary nature of the coercive new CIL he was proposing.85 Fourth, he
repeatedly assured his readers that international officials and scholars could
be trusted not to abuse their new power to make and find CIL for the world
community.86 Fifth, and somewhat relatedly, he pledged that the new CIL
would not deviate unduly from physical state practice.87 Sixth and finally, he
touted the procedural normativity of the new CIL process. All states,
regardless of their wealth or power, would have the opportunity to participate
fully in consideration of proposed CIL norms,88 and there would be
heightened transparency regarding the precise status of each debated norm.89

84 See Charney, supra note 13, at 544 n.61. In making this point Charney neglected to
mention that, although it may be costly to do so, any state outvoted in the IGO context can
avoid the reach of adverse rules by invoking the nuclear option of exiting the IGO
altogether. See Stephan, supra note 27, at 249-50. As noted supra note 61 and
accompanying text, unilateral withdrawal has not traditionally been a legal option for states
in the CIL context.
85 In difference to Charney, Louis Henkin, an ideological ally, did not seek to downplay
the radical nature of CIL’s transformation. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 37 (1995) (noting that the changes in the way CIL was beginning to
be created marked “a radical innovation, and indeed reflect[ed] a radical conception.”)
Other scholars hewed to a middle position that applauded the new CIL while cautioning
against going too far, too fast, lest a backlash ensue. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 17, at
114; Charlesworth, supra note 62, at 46.
86 See Charney, supra note 13, at 540-41 (risk of abuse of new lawmaking authority is
“slight”); id. at 548 (“While it is possible that the [new CIL] process may be abused, it is
less open to abuse and miscommunication than classical customary lawmaking”); id. at
550 (sovereignty and autonomy interests will be taken into account before universality is
chosen); id. at 551 (international legal system will invoke new lawmaking authority
“sparingly”). Regarding this last assurance, Charney almost immediately contradicted
himself. Compare id. at 530 (“Today, the enormous destructive potential of some activities
and the precarious condition of some objects of international concern make full autonomy
undesirable.”), with id. at 531 (“I explore the limits of state autonomy to determine whether
some or all of international law may be made universally binding regardless of the position
of one or a small number of unwilling states.”) (emphases added).
87 See id. at 546 n.71 (“Certainly, if the state practice is inconsistent with the principle
adopted at the international forum, that principle would be open to serious question.”). This
promise, however, was belied by the near-contemporaneous assessment of Simma and
Alston, who saw in the new approach “a law-making process which is more or less
complete in itself, even in the face of contrasting ‘external’ facts.” Simma & Alston, supra
note 11, at 90.
88 See Charney, supra note 13, at 547, 550-51.
89 Charney seems to have envisioned a deliberative, legislative-like process in which
proposed norms would come with clear labels indicating whether they reflected “a
refinement, codification, crystallization or progressive development of international law.”
Id. at 544, 547. Among other things, such labels would “permit[] states more accurately to
distinguish legal from political solutions.” Id. at 547.
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It is this last element that I wish to focus on, because, unlike Charney’s
other selling points, it represented a significant and beguiling inducement for
sovereigntists. Charney was essentially proposing a grand bargain by which
states would surrender their right of dissent in exchange for the right to be
effectively heard. Even if one could not fully agree with the charges of
authoritarianism and opacity levelled against traditional CIL,90 and even if one
did not think the proposed trade a fair one,91 the promise of increased clarity
in any lawmaking enterprise was nothing to be sneezed at. That said, it was
an empty promise from the beginning and it is vitally important to understand
why—not merely to settle old academic scores, but because the failure of the
promise explains much about the nature of contemporary CIL that would
otherwise be either incomprehensible or underappreciated.
ii.

Of Funhouses, Fake Custom, Sheepdogging and Alchemy

Recall that Charney’s main target was treaty-making and the lack of
universality that often attended it.92 In other words, his target was states that
did not wish to be bound. How, exactly, would CIL be able to help with this
situation? In its 1969 opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the
ICJ had confirmed that a norm-creating provision of a treaty could generate a
new, identical rule of CIL that would be universally binding.93 The Court
indicated that if all states having an interest in the provision became parties to
the treaty, CIL might arise rather easily.94 However, the presence of any holdouts would present a very different scenario. In that case, there would be no
steamrolling. Interested non-party states would become bound only if they, in
effect, reconsidered their opposition to the norm-creating provision and began
acting consistently with it out of a sense of legal obligation.95 Such a change
in disposition was “not lightly to be regarded as having been attained.”96 The
ICJ’s approach to treaty-based CIL-formation made it unlikely that the kind
of transparent process of CIL-adoption envisioned by Charney would deliver
the results he wanted. Why would any state knowingly affirm support for a
CIL rule that would nullify the choice it had made in rejecting or reserving to
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Stephan questioned early on the conventional belief that increased transparency could
serve as an adequate substitute for more direct forms of political accountability. See
Stephan, supra note 20, at 1581-82.
92 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
93 See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep.
3, 42 ¶ 71 (Feb. 20).
94 See id. at 43, ¶ 73.
95 See id. at 44-45, ¶¶ 74, 76.
96 Id. at 42, ¶ 71. Indeed, the ICJ’s analysis of Germany’s behavior made clear that the
evidence of the change in disposition would have to be unequivocal. See id. at 45-46, ¶¶
77-78.
90
91
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a treaty? Indeed, why would even non-reserving states-parties knowingly
affirm support for a subsequent, identical CIL rule given that doing so might
render their treaty-based rights of withdrawal meaningless?97 While Charney
did not address this clear stumbling block to his proposal and avoided
discussion of North Sea altogether,98 some otherwise sympathetic
commentators could not help but acknowledge it,99 and opponents clearly saw
where things were headed. To paraphrase Prosper Weil, if the new CIL was
going to succeed in its universality mission, it would have to “cunningly
outflank,” rather than “frontally assault,” the flexibility mechanisms of
treaties.100
Much the same point could be made regarding the second type of workproduct of multilateral fora that Charney hoped would serve as a source of the
new CIL, viz. instruments, whether formally nonbinding or binding in nature,
that do not purport to codify or reflect existing CIL. Such instruments grace
the world under cover of various titles (e.g. “declaration,” “programme of
action,” “agenda,” “compact,” and “framework”). For ease of reference I shall
refer to them collectively as “resolutions.” Resolutions express normative
opinio juris—affirmations that reveal what states believe the law should be.
They are to be distinguished from instruments that express descriptive opinio
juris—affirmations that reveal what states believe the law actually is.101 States
97 Bradley and Gulati support a post-crystallization exit right from CIL partly because it
would spare states from the “anomaly” of being trapped in a CIL norm that is based on a
treaty from which withdrawal is possible. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 262-63.
98 He did appear to acknowledge the North Sea precedent indirectly when he stated that
he did not “intend to suggest that all generally applicable treaty texts become ipso facto
and ab initio customary international law upon adoption or entry into force.” Charney,
supra note 13, at 547.
99 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 768-69 (“It is also not clear that states know that treaties
will become customary law, or that they wish them to, though this may be changing.”)
(citation omitted).
100 Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 413, 438 (1983). Some commentators might argue that the ICJ’s analysis in North Sea
was not intended to govern CIL-derivation from treaties seeking to address the kind of
global problems identified by Charney. They would have something of a point; the Court’s
language (“specially affected” state interests and the like) makes little sense in the “global
concern” context. That said, the Court neither expressed nor implied a limitation in the
application of its rule, and the ILC recently poured cold water on the notion that different
areas of international law are governed by different subsets of secondary rules. See Draft
Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 2, cmt. (6) (describing international law as “a
single legal system . . . not divided into separate branches with their own approach to
sources”) (citation omitted). Moreover, if certain “global concern” treaties, such as human
rights instruments, are indeed “different,” it may be because—as Weisburd argued long
ago—their typical lack of enforcement and reparations mechanisms warrants the
assumption that they do not give rise to CIL. See Weisburd, supra note 30, at 23-29.
101 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 763-64 (explaining the difference between these two
types of opinio). For an example of a formally nonbinding expression of descriptive opinio
juris, see G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law
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like resolutions because they allow them to signal support for a goal without
being legally bound to achieve it. Globalists like such instruments because
their non-threatening “soft” quality can result in greater state participation.102
However, could states be counted on to knowingly assent to a CIL rule that
would change the nature of their commitment from a political to a legal one?
One need only consider states’ spotty track record in agreeing to the
conversion of their political commitments into legally binding treaty
obligations to understand that this was far from likely.103 Moreover, the ICJ
indicated in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons that even an expression of normative opinio juris strong
enough to border on nascent descriptive opinio juris can fail to give rise to
CIL if it is stubbornly resisted by a small minority of highly relevant states.104
This secondary-rule interpretation cast doubt on the very idea of aspirationdriven, super-majority customary lawmaking in multilateral fora. In doing so,
it further ensured that stealth, not transparency, would become the tactic of
necessity in engineering the new universal CIL.
We can see this stealth at work in what are arguably the two most important
CIL-formation developments of the last twenty-five years. The first concerns
the well-documented increase in the number of actors that might legitimately
bid a CIL norm for consideration by the community of states. While Charney
had seemed to reserve for state representatives working the halls of IGOs the
exclusive right to formulate and propose new CIL norms, other scholars were
not nearly as deferential to state authority on this point. Koh, for example,
advocated a “transnational legal process” in which the content of new
international legal norms, both customary and conventional, would be worked
out in conversations between “norm entrepreneurs” (a collection of nonstate
actors (NSAs) consisting chiefly of private transnational organizations and
charismatic individuals) and “governmental norm sponsors” (sympathetic

Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970).
102 See Meyer, supra note 62, at 34 (“Soft law, by making obligations nonbinding, may
ease resistance among dissenting states.”). Of course, soft language that is designed to ease
national resistance must be distinguished from soft language that is designed to circumvent
it. I discuss this latter type infra Part I.B.
103 Accord Roberts, supra note 64, at 769. Roberts writes:
[V]otes in the General Assembly usually receive little media scrutiny and
are generally not intended to make law. For example, the General
Assembly resolution on torture was adopted unanimously, while a much
smaller number of states ratified the Convention Against Torture and
others entered significant reservations to it.
Id.
104 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, 255 ¶ 73 (July 8).
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national government officials).105 Such conversations would generate
“political solutions” concrete enough to be tabled in any number of “lawdeclaring fora,” where they would be further refined, elaborated, and tested
by an “interpretive community” before being formally presented to the
community of states for collective consideration.106 The implications of this
proposed process were at once understated and stunning. Instead of generating
the relevant state practice through physical acts (traditional CIL), or via the
activity involved in proposing, debating, and voting on norms in multilateral
fora (Charney’s new-look CIL), states and their representatives began to be
cast in the role of mere respondents to norms authored off-stage by an
assortment of globe-trotting, transnational “others.” 107
This, to say the least, represented a considerable demotion. It was a
demotion that became cemented as faith in the virtue and salutary effect of
NGOs, already frothy in the 1990s,108 bubbled over completely in the early
2000s,109 leading globalist scholars to offer increasingly bold proposals
regarding NGO/NSA participation in, and normative significance for, the
CIL-formation process. A good example in this regard is the work of Monica
Hakimi. After scrutinizing—and ostensibly criticizing—certain CIL claims
made by certain NSAs, Hakimi dons the mantle of legal realism to advise her
fellow scholars to shed their preoccupation with CIL-finding methodology
and adopt instead the view that many CIL claims are, in whole or in part, pure
advocacy that should be judged as such (i.e. judged by their success in gaining
traction within the international community).110 Although Hakimi insists that
her advice not be taken to mean that “‘anything goes” in CIL,111 it is hard to
see how it does not mean precisely that given that it paves the way for NSAs
to become full-fledged norm-makers whose own opinio juris might trump any
inconsistent state practice not affirmatively supported by a counter-opinio. In
fact, Hakimi quotes without criticism Jean-Marie Henckaert et al.’s study of
the International Committee of the Red Cross for just such a proposition:
It appears that international courts and tribunals on occasion
conclude that a rule of customary international law exists when
the rule is a desirable one . . . for the protection of the human

105 See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced? 74 IND.
L.J. 1397, 1409-10 (1999).
106 See id.
107 Despite its otherwise conservative approach to CIL-formation, the ILC appears to
accept the idea of states playing the role of respondents to norms proposed by NSAs and
private individuals. See Draft Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 4, cmt. (8).
108 See Anderson, supra note 18, at 1264.
109 For a description of the many ways NSAs were seeking to become involved in CILformation circa 2001, see Roberts, supra note 64, at 775.
110 See Hakimi, supra note 59, at 170-71.
111 Id. at 171.
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person, provided that there is no important contrary opinio
juris.112
If this ever were to become accepted practice we would find ourselves well
beyond the boundary of the rule, controversially laid down by the ICJ in
Nicaragua v. United States, that uniform and descriptive state opinio juris (not
NSA opinio) could trump inconsistent practice unsupported by a counteropinio.113
One question sure to arise in such a new legal landscape is whether states
will need to heed and object to NSA opinio juris in order to preserve their
right of unilateral CIL-exemption post-crystallization. If they will, we can
expect to see a significant increase in the monitoring burden placed on
potential persistent objectors.114 Even if they will not, the already elevated
status of NSAs as legitimate semi-participants in the arena of CIL-formation
goes some way toward transforming Louis Henkin’s august “cathedral” of
international law115 into something more akin to a funhouse, in which norm
proposals are capable of popping out of any odd nook and cranny. In a world
in which CIL-finders may just as well be deemed CIL-makers, anything truly
does go.
The second major CIL-formation development, somewhat related to this
first one, has been the frequent resort to ambiguity in presenting the nature of
the norms that emerge from Koh’s transnational, NSA-dominated
brainstorming sessions. Charney’s hopes notwithstanding, norm-proposals
representing lex ferenda have repeatedly been camouflaged in resolutions as
lex lata.116 This has been done through the use, in some instances, of
mandatory language,117 and in others of such a tremendous amount of
regulatory detail and specificity as to deprive proposals of any hortatory
Id. at 169 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 207-209 (June 27).
114 I discuss the persistent-objector rule in greater detail infra Part I.A.iii.
115 It apparently was Koh who attributed this metaphor to Henkin. See Harold Hongju
Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293,
308 (2002).
116 As Roberts explained:
[D]eclarations do not merely photograph or declare the current state of
practice on moral issues. Rather, they often reflect a deliberate ambiguity
between actual and desired practice, designed to develop the law and to
stretch the consensus on the text as far as possible. . . . As a result,
modern custom often represents progressive development of the law
masked as codification by phrasing lex ferenda as lex lata.
Roberts, supra note 64, at 763 (citations omitted).
117 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007) (providing that states “shall” take effective measures
to secure a number of the rights identified).
112
113
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feel.118 The effect of such lata packaging is not only, or even principally, to
“stretch the consensus on the text” (Roberts’s surmise), but to induce enough
actual implementation of the norm by sympathetic officials at the national
level to justify a later finding of CIL-formation at the international level. The
dynamic is at once simple and clever: Lata-esque resolutions are used to
convey to states strong expectations of desired behavior; once a number of
states respond positively to these cues, their responsive practice is cited in
support of a conclusion that a custom has emerged.119 Such custom might best
be conceptualized as “Fake Custom,” in that international actors instigate,
through soft-law agreements, the very state practice they later rely on to normdeclare. In effect, states deliver up the practice they are admonished to deliver
and then, as their “reward,” they find themselves caught in the webs woven
of their own good intentions.120
It does not take a great deal of imagination to see how these two
developments, as they unfolded together, created an environment in which
norms could pass into the corpus of CIL without anybody knowing precisely
how or why they did so. Consider, as an example in this regard, the recentlyconcluded Arms Trade Treaty, a multilateral treaty that regulates the
international trade in conventional weapons.121 As of this writing one hundred

See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (1992).
This dynamic was foreshadowed as early as 1962 by the U.N. Secretariat when it
noted that a General Assembly declaration “may be considered to impart . . . a strong
expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it. . . . [I]n so far
as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom
become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.” Memorandum of the Office
of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610, para. 4, (quoted in 34 U.N.
ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, U.N. Doc. E/3614/Rev.1 (1962)). See also Charlesworth,
supra note 62, at 46. Charlesworth wrote:
[T]he use of international law in national laws itself contributes to the
formation of custom. In this way the ‘state practice’ requirement for
custom can be met through the activities of particular arms of the state,
such as the judiciary, which may have views that differ markedly from
those of the executive or legislative branches.
Id.
120 Koh essentially described Fake Custom when he wrote:
A state-to-state process account simply does not capture the full picture
of how international human rights norms are currently generated, brought
into domestic systems, and then brought back up to the international
level. . . . Once again, an international law norm trickled down, was
internalized, and bubbled back up into new international law.
Koh, supra note 105, at 1412, 1414.
121 Final U.N. Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty: Draft Decision, art. 1, Mar. 27,
2013, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.217/2013.L.3. On April 2, 2013, the U.N. General Assembly
passed a resolution adopting the treaty as contained in the annex to the draft declaration
and recommending that nations join the treaty. G.A. Res. 67/234, Arms Trade Treaty (Apr.
2, 2013) [hereinafter ATT].
118
119
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states have ratified the ATT, a modest number that does not include major
arms-exporting countries like China, Russia and the United States.122 Despite
the fact that the ATT’s prohibitions and constraints on state action had no
basis in pre-existing CIL,123 civil society activists began claiming, even prior
to the treaty’s entry into force in 2014, that it would soon give rise to identical
CIL norms that would be binding on non-party states.124 Precisely how CIL
would arise to accomplish this feat of coercion the activists did not say.125 But
one can be forgiven for thinking that their own advocacy and self-appointed
role in monitoring treaty implementation,126 combined with the growing
campaign to cast gun violence as a human-rights issue,127 will have something
to do with it. To call this process of CIL-formation “little-understood,” as
Bradley and Goldsmith did in the late 1990s,128 was a kind understatement.
122 Arms Trade Treaty Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26&clang=_en
(last updated Oct. 02, 2019).
123 See Anna MacDonald, UN Arms Trade Treaty Can Save Many Lives – If It Is Robustly
Enforced, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2014) https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
poverty-matters/2014/sep/25/un-arms-trade-treaty-exports-sales (“This treaty demands a
radical shift in behaviour by the major arms exporters who must lead the way in
demonstrating a new sense of responsibility when it comes to trading in arms.”).
124 MacDonald writes:
Once the treaty enters into force and becomes binding international law,
it will create a strong deterrent for all countries – even those not a party
to it – to end uncontrolled arms transfers. It has happened before, for
example, following the development of the mine ban treaty and it will
happen again. A comprehensive treaty will help accelerate and develop
a specific international norm which, over time, simply cannot be ignored.
Id.
125 See id.
126 The umbrella NGO behind the ATT (Control Arms) has vowed that “civil society will
closely monitor implementation of the Treaty, and press their national governments to
produce and to make public the most comprehensive national reports possible.” Control
Arms, Summary Analysis of the Arms Trade Treaty, SAFER WORLD (May 2013),
https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/737-summary-analysis-of-thearms-trade-treaty.
127 The NGOs have taken the lead in this campaign. See, e.g., Lois Beckett, ‘A Human
Rights Crisis’: US Accused of Failing to Protect Citizens from Gun Violence, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/12/us-gun-control-hum
an-rights-amnesty-international. But scholars are not far behind. See, e.g., Interdisciplinary
and Human Rights Approaches to the Gun Violence Crisis in the United States, WASH.
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Nov. 2, 2018), https://publichealth.wustl.edu/events/interdisciplinaryand-human-rights-approaches-to-the-gun-violence-crisis-in-the-united-states/.
One tactical advantage for globalists in dressing policy goals like stricter gun
regulation in the garb of “human rights” is that state exemption from any prohibitive norms
that develop may become more difficult. See GREEN, supra note 41, at 208-25 (exploring
the view that persistent objection is not available apropos norms of customary international
human rights law deemed “fundamental” but not jus cogens).
128 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 328.
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To call the process “greatly under-analyzed,” which they also did,129 was a
syntactical error, for it lends itself to analysis about as much as legislative
horse-trading in the proverbial dark-and-smoke-filled back room. I myself
propose the function-focused term “sheepdogging” to describe CIL’s activity
in this context, as CIL mimics a sheepdog in the way it rounds up wayward
treaty-refusers and reservers and gets them into the treaty corral. James Green
has recently given this surprisingly candid example of sheepdogging:
[N]ot all states are parties to the Ottawa Convention on
antipersonnel landmines (APLM), but there are strong
indications that an equivalent customary ban is evolving, if it
has not already evolved. This prohibition, of course, catches
(or will catch) any remaining dissident states that have not
already gained exemption through prior persistent
objection.130
In addition to the ATT we might also consider the recently concluded
“Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” which by its own
terms presents a “non-legally binding cooperative framework” 131 (i.e. a set of
aspirational/political commitments) on the subject of migration. In a 2018
interview in which he urged his government to reject the Compact, the leader
of the opposition party in New Zealand (Simon Bridges) appeared resigned to
the inevitability of the Compact’s commitments eventually hardening into
law. His choice of words was revealing:
[The Compact] is creating a situation where we know even if
it is not binding, over time it will become part of our laws, it
will become interpreted by the judiciary. We don’t need to do
that. What part of our settings is wrong in immigration and
why would we cede this?132
Exactly what the “situation” was that Bridges was referring to is unclear,
and I suspect that not even he could describe it with any precision. But two
things are clear: (1) Whatever the nature of the “situation” might be, it is
unlikely to resemble anything like the formal, legislative-like process
Id.
GREEN, supra note 42, at 149 (citations omitted).
131 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (July 11, 2018), ¶ 7,
https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf
[hereinafter Global Migration Compact or Compact].
132 Simon Bridges on UN Migration Pact: We Already Have ‘Good, if Not Excellent’
Immigration Policy, RADIO NZ (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/
377887/simon-bridges-on-un-migration-pact-we-already-have-good-if-not-excellent-imm
igration-policy.
129
130
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envisioned by Charney; and (2) Bridges’s sense of inevitability is fully
justified by history. He undoubtedly would have been aware of the significant
effort his country had to make in order to avoid becoming legally bound by
the aspirational provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.133 He also presumably would have known of the United
States’ bruising experience in trying to remain legally free of the economic
and social-rights provisions of the UDHR. In this latter case, it was not enough
for the United States to successfully lobby for and secure what everyone
agrees was a purely hortatory instrument at its inception.134 Nor was it enough
for the United States to decline to ratify the treaty that was eventually crafted
to offer these provisions in legally binding form (the ICESCR). No, in the
eyes of many—excluding, perhaps, Messrs. Puras and Alston—the United
States has succeeded in remaining free of the legal obligation to comply with
these provisions only because it has taken the additional step of persistently
objecting to them.135 Notice how the burden has been shifted onto treatyrejecters to prove to the satisfaction of the international community that they
well and truly wish to remain free of a treaty norm. The sovereigntyrespecting “opt in if you’d like” spirit of North Sea has been imperceptibly
transformed into an “opt out if you dare and can” warning.
These examples, though few in number, illustrate what may be the ultimate
moral of the “new CIL” story, which is that in many instances the absorption
into CIL of hortatory norms and purely conventional obligations has become
a foregone conclusion. Absorption simply will occur via an opaque,
alchemical process that evinces no particular methodology other than the “byhook-or-by-crook” kind.136 Perhaps Hakimi was right after all (at least in her
descriptive intuitions): Modern CIL-formation really does seem to come down

133 Similar efforts were made by Australia, Canada and the United States. See GREEN,
supra note 42, at 232-33.
134 See Charlesworth, supra note 58, at ¶ 7 (“[T]he US supported the idea of a declaration
of principles whose force would be primarily moral”); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 287, 317 (1995) (“It is, of course, unanimously agreed that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was not viewed as imposing legal obligations on states at the
time of its adoption by the General Assembly in 1948.”).
135 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 102-03, 102 n.73, 180-81 (confirming consensus that
U.S. qualifies as persistent objector to UDHR- and ICESCR-based CIL right to adequate
food).
136 Weil foresaw this development with his characteristic blend of insight and dread:
[T]he intention manifested by a state in regard to a given convention is
henceforth of little account: whether it signs it or not, becomes party to
it or not, enters reservations to such and such a clause or not, it will in
any case be bound by any provisions of the convention that are
recognized to possess the character of rules of customary or general
international law.
Weil, supra note 100, at 440 (emphasis added).
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to the force of advocacy, with NGO-generated media-buzz and spin counting
as an important factor. Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that, from a
methodological standpoint, the only truly debatable question that remains for
contemporary CIL is whether states have taken the steps needed to secure
exemption via persistent objection from its near-inevitable rule-formation.
Again, the shifting of the burden should be more than clear.
iii.

Persistent Objectors Need Not Apply

And it is here where the rubber finally meets the road, for in the hands of
globalist scholars this burden has become virtually impossible to meet. James
Green’s recent well-received study137 argues in favor of recognizing several
severe attributes of modern persistent objection. First, states must monitor and
be prepared to object to virtually any instrument that comes out of a
multilateral forum, and they must do so even if they have previously lodged a
formal rejection of or reservation to the instrument.138 In so far as treaties and
resolutions are concerned, this persistency requirement means that a state’s
formal decision to withhold its consent from an instrument, or to reserve to a
part thereof, is just the beginning of its involvement with the instrument, not—
as might reasonably be expected—the end. This, again, flips the logic of North
Sea. Second, given the rapidity with which the new CIL can form,139 and the
claimed unavailability of objection post-crystallization,140 states may have a
very small temporal window in which to make their objections known.141
Third, in addition to expressing their objection persistently, states must refrain
from any action or statement, including “acts” of pregnant silence, which
might be construed as being inconsistent with their objection. 142 Fourth and
finally, once an exemption is legally secured, a state will nonetheless forfeit
it if at any time post-crystallization it ceases voicing its opposition to the
norm.143

137 See GREEN, supra note 42. The study won the 2017 Book Prize of the European
Society of International Law. 2017 ESIL Book Prize, ESIL, https://esil-sedi.eu/2017-esilbook-prize/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
138 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 85-87.
139 Charney touted this rapidity and predicted that two major resolutions that had been
adopted shortly before the publication of his article–the 1992 Agenda 21 and the 1993
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action–would birth new CIL in short order. See
Charney, supra note 13, at 549.
140 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 135-53. I address this claim infra note 160.
141 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 153-62, 170-73.
142 See id. at 116-30. Whether he intends to or not, Green gives the impression of pronorm state representatives and NGO activists prowling the halls of multilateral conferences
looking to document any small slip-of-the-tongue or failure-to-speak by anti-norm
representatives.
143 See id. at 182-84.
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Neither logic nor consistency of principle can explain this draconian set of
rules.144 As even Sohn acknowledged, logic would seem to dictate that the
easier it becomes for international actors to form CIL, the easier it should be
for states to exercise their right of unilateral exemption.145 Logic dictates that
as the procedural normativity of CIL dims and the possibility of genuine ex
ante state voice declines,146 the opportunity for ex post state exit should
expand.147 Logic dictates that as CIL (and international law in general)
increasingly concerns itself with matters traditionally lying within states’
domestic jurisdictions, and as an increasing number of states adopt the
democratic form, exemption should become easier, not harder.148 Logic
dictates that states should enjoy roughly the same subsequent unilateral
withdrawal rights from CIL that they enjoy from treaties.149 Finally, logic
dictates the limits of the claim that a narrow-exemption rule is needed across
all areas of international law in order to protect states’ reliance interests.150
How, for example, are France’s legitimate expectations even remotely upset,
or its need for confidence in the stability of the international legal environment
even remotely frustrated, by the fact that the United States, or any other
country, seeks exemption from a human rights norm? Green does not tell us,
and for good reason. They are not.151

144 Green himself describes the rules as “onerous.” Id. at 246. The ILC describes them as
“stringent.” See Draft Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 15, cmt. (1).
145 See Sohn, supra note 17, at 1080 (“[T]he easier it becomes to develop new principles
and rules of international law, the more a safety valve is needed to safeguard national
sovereignty and vital state interests.”).
146 See supra Part I.A.ii.
147 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 242-44.
148 Like Charney before him, Green ignores the reality of democratic politics at the
national level and fails to consider its implications for his analysis. He assumes, for
example, that when a state seeks to alter its stance toward an existing CIL norm, it does so
for unprincipled and opportunistic reasons rather than because a majority of its citizens,
via participation in the electoral process, have exercised their sovereign right to change
their collective mind and reorient national policy around a new norm. See GREEN, supra
note 42, at 131.
149 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 204-05, 270-75.
150 Green makes this claim repeatedly throughout his analysis. See, e.g., GREEN, supra
note 42, at 145-47.
151 Charney claimed that certain gross violations of human rights (such as apartheid and
genocide) that are committed within a single state “might threaten international peace and
security worldwide.” Charney, supra note 13, at 530. Fair enough; one could grant him this
point even though he chose to assert it rather than argue it. However, the claim’s
plausibility does not easily extend to less systemic violations of human rights, such as,
allegedly, the use of the juvenile death penalty. If the rehabilitation of youthful offenders
is an “object[] of international concern,” it is not because one state is directly affected by
another state’s judgment on the issue, but because all states must, in the course of their
own self-administration, render a judgment. Id. Globalist scholars and officials muddy the
intellectual waters when they conflate common or shared problems, in the latter sense, with
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As for consistency of principle—or more precisely, lack thereof—it would
take a small article in its own right to fully explore the double standards that
animate Green’s analysis. Here is a brief summary of the main ones:
• States need not publicly affirm their desire to continue enjoying
their rights under treaty in order to maintain them. Rather, treaty
rights are deemed extinguished (via the process of desuetude) only
if a state fails to exercise its right for an extended period of time
and/or fails to protest physical conduct that violates or interferes
with the right. Why, then, should mere post-crystallization
silence, pregnant or otherwise, be enough to work a forfeiture of
an established right of CIL-exemption?
• In the human-rights context, lack of objection is typically not
deemed acquiescence in the formation of permissive norms,152 yet
it typically is deemed behavior sufficiently indicative of
acquiescence to defeat a later claim of exemption from prohibitive
norms. How is it that a state can “object without objecting” in the
former context but not in the latter?
• In attacking the procedural normativity of classical CILformation, scholars have made much of the fact that smaller states
lacked the resources to keep track of all norms bid by wealthier
and more powerful states through their physical state practice.153
However, when it comes to protecting smaller states’ ability to
keep track of bid norms for the purpose of timely objection,
scholars tend to show no such concern. Green, for example, takes
no issue with the fact that under the current set of rules “even the
most vigilant state may still find that its objections come too
late.”154
• It is widely understood and accepted that CIL can be not only
shockingly indeterminate in its formation but also messily
unstable in its evolution. Making new CIL can often be done only
by violating old CIL; and states that grow dissatisfied with an
existing CIL norm, but lack the numbers to change it, can still opt
out of it via treaty (provided the rule is not jus cogens). Yet when
it comes to arguing for a narrow exemption for persistent
objectors, scholars like Green rather suddenly awaken to a grave
need for certainty and stability within the CIL realm.155

externalized ones requiring international regulation and enforcement. Accord Anderson,
supra note 18, at 1305.
152 See Roberts, supra note 64, at 778.
153 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
154 GREEN, supra note 42, at 278 (emphasis added).
155 See id. at 148, 153.
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•

Charney proposed that “one clearly phrased and strongly
endorsed declaration at a near-universal diplomatic forum could
be sufficient to establish new international law.”156 If that is so
then it is reasonable to ask why one clearly phrased and strongly
endorsed objection should not be enough to establish an
exemption from such international law. To his credit, Green
hedges slightly in claiming that persistency is needed to ensure
adequate notice to other states.157 He appears to value the
persistency criterion mostly for the enriching effect it can have on
interstate discourse.158 Tellingly, however, he offers no evidence
to suggest that discourse will fail to take place unless it is legally
incentivized.
Green would be hard-pressed to deny the result-oriented nature of his
analysis given that, in his more candid moments, he all but admits that the
goal is to build out the power of the international legal system, not infuse it
with principle. The rules, he writes, are designed to force dissenting states to
remain at the table of norm-discussion until, essentially, they fold.159
Subsequent objection and withdrawal cannot be tolerated because, if they
were, CIL would be disabled from performing its critical sheepdog function
of binding non-states-parties to treaty norms.160 This is why rational choice-

See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See GREEN, supra note 42, at 277 (“The need for persistence tests the will of the
objector to ensure that the rule is not used frivolously and, at least to an extent, promotes
clarity and certainty”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
158 See id. at 269-70.
159 See id. at 97, 105, 126.
160 See id. at 149. Green argues that the rule disallowing subsequent objection can be
derived from state practice, citing two cases in the post-World War II era in which
subsequent objection was attempted and failed. See id. at 140-43. But neither case supports
his position. In Case 1 the failure of the equatorial states to exempt themselves from a rule
permitting the geostationary orbit of satellites foundered in significant part on the fact that
most of the objecting states were parties to a treaty (the Outer Space Treaty of 1967) that
forbade the very territorial claims they were trying to protect via objection. It is far from
clear that the rejection of the objectors’ position would have been as universal as it was
had pro-custom treaty law not been involved. In Case 2, France was not claiming a right
of exemption from the pre-existing CIL relating to treaty interpretation, but just the
opposite: France contended that it was bound by that pre-existing CIL rather than by
similar, but allegedly non-identical, provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, to which it was not a party. Notably, when the ILC restated the persistent-objector
rule in 2015, it did not adduce any precedential state practice, relying instead on a single
line of dicta from the North Sea decision. See Draft Conclusions, supra note 23, at
Conclusion 15, cmts. (1) & (5).
Green makes much of the fact that states do not tend to invoke the right of subsequent
objection. Yet, he concedes that many states would readily do so if they thought they could.
See GREEN, supra note 42, at 140, 150. The question is: Why don’t they think they can?
Green is not especially curious on this point, but he should be. States are likely deterred by
156
157
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inspired analyses of the persistent-objector rule, to which Green is otherwise
sympathetic,161 make so little headway with him when it comes to some of
their discrete findings—most notably their conclusion that the availability of
subsequent objection and exit would strengthen international law, not weaken
it.162 As any good systems analyst knows, strengthening a system is not the
same as tightening it. Since Green’s and the globalists’ priority is tightening,
strengthening holds relatively little attraction for them.163
In one sense it may be unfair to single Green out for criticism, as there are
scholars who are far less sympathetic to the persistent-objector rule than he.
Some scholars, for example, reject the de jure nature of the exemption
altogether.164 Others advance ideas that have the effect of drastically lessening
the rule’s utility, such as that of “accelerated custom,” which collapses the
temporal window for objecting,165 and of “fundamental” norms, which
allegedly share with jus cogens the happy quality of being immune to
objection.166 To his credit Green rejects each of these moves.167 That said, his
work shows just how unfriendly toward sovereignty-rights even the milder
works of globalist scholarship can be. Further, there is no denying that Green’s
approach does reflect mainstream scholarly opinion on the subject of
persistent objection.168 The upshot, therefore, is a contemporary CIL that is
arguably every bit as coercive as Charney had hoped, minus the charm of
transparency.
Indeed, engineering universal compliance with norms expressed in treaties
and resolutions seems to be CIL’s main role these days, as it rarely generates
the content of first-order rules on its own. The twentieth-century phenomenon
the fact that “the considerable majority of scholars”—a group that includes Green
himself—”reject the notion of subsequent objection.” Id. at 140.
161 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 257-60.
162 See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 241-75; Guzman, supra note 64, at 16472.
163 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 278. Green writes:
Providing states with an ‘opt-out’ from emerging norms of customary
international law has its systematic benefits, but there is no reason to
make it easy for the objector: the dice are, and should be, loaded in favour
of the majority.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Green’s preference here is undoubtedly
motivated by his belief—more asserted than argued—that universalism “has a greater
overall utility” than a system characterized by permissible state deviation. Id. at 259.
164 See id. at 5 n.27 (citing these scholars).
165 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law,
20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305 (2013).
166 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 210 n.8 (citing scholars who promote this idea).
167 See id. at 55, 173, 224.
168 It is also consistent with the ILC’s recent restatement of the rule, especially as regards
the unavailability of subsequent objection and the requirement that objection continue to
be voiced after the point at which an exemption has been legally secured. See Draft
Conclusions, supra note 23, at Conclusion 15, cmts. (5) & (9).
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known as the “CIL of the gaps” is fast disappearing. It is hard to imagine any
issue on which true physical state practice stands a chance of beating
international-conference-cooperative-frameworking
to
the
punch—
excepting, of course, those rare instances in which physical state practice
actually serves globalist purposes. Rebecca Crootof, for example, has recently
urged the recognition of the dominance of practice-based CIL in cases where
a state or group of states seek to modify, through their behavior, the terms of
a multilateral treaty against the wishes of states counter-parties.169 Crootof
touts her proposal as “radical”170 and I sadly must agree, for it does represent
a new and unusual example of the doctrinal weaponization of CIL against
treaties.
Yet for all of contemporary CIL’s coercive mission and effect one
important caveat must be lodged, and that is that coercive power should not
be mistaken for enforcement power, nor even for enforcement pretensions.
For the most part, contemporary CIL is content to form as a theoretical matter
and then stop, leaving the prosaic and sometimes bitter work of enforcement
to sympathetic national officials (viz. the janus-faced judges and bureaucrats
who man the vertical networks that feature so prominently in the works of
Koh171 and like-minded political scientist Anne Marie Slaughter172). One
wonders, in this vein, whether Puras and Alston even cared whether their
statements accurately reflected international law. Their obvious common
audience was not the international but the American one; their obvious
common goal, not to lay the groundwork for hauling the United States before
an international tribunal, but to make claims colorable enough to serve as
ammunition for domestic allies seeking to align national law with
international standards. The Washington Post reporter who broke the story of
the Puras Letter seems to have appreciated this very point, writing:
Though of questionable legal value, the U.N. letter is at least a
bit of moral support for those defending Obamacare. Those
attempting to deny health care to tens of millions of Americans

169 See Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law
Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237 (2016).
170 Id. at 286.
171 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT’L
L. REV. 745 (2006); Koh, supra note 105; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); see also Koh, supra note 19, at 361 (“I long ago
described a pervasive phenomenon in international affairs that I call ‘transnational legal
process,’ which holds that international law is primarily enforced not by coercion, but by
a process of internalized compliance.”) (emphasis in original).
172 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
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would hurt their own constituents in a way that falls short of
the standards we hold for ourselves and other countries.173
This globalist strategy of eschewing the overt and external imposition of
international law in favor of its more subtle internalization via elements of the
“disaggregated state” 174 has two important implications. First, it goes a good
way toward rendering irrelevant the long-debated concern about the
compliance deficit at the heart of the international order, as that concern rests
in significant part on an assumption of unitary states uncompromised from
within.175 Second, the strategy marginalizes, and in so doing neutralizes, the
more conservative approach to CIL-formation taken by the ICJ and, to a lesser
extent, the ILC. This is because the success of internalization depends not on
what international law is authoritatively declared to be by international
institutions, but on what it is plausibly portrayed as being by key domestic
actors speaking to domestic audiences. I shall address the work of these
domestic actors in some detail in Part II of this Article.
B. Retooling Treaties to Cure Their Own Mischief
The previous section examined how globalist legal scholars have sought
to refashion CIL into a tool for indirectly undermining the consensual nature
of treaty obligations. However, in recent years their attack on treaties has
become more direct and frontal (to paraphrase Weil). They have not only
employed several strategies for making international agreements themselves
as sticky as possible, but have sought to work a subtle reconceptualization of
the very nature of conventional commitment in order to insulate agreements
from any “reactionary” forces of change that might emerge at the domestic
level.
i.

The Government Is Dead. Long Live Its International Commitments!

Let’s begin with the reworking of the treaty concept, for it is the bolder
and more ambitious of the two phenomena. When President Trump entered
office, he announced his intention to end U.S. participation in the Paris
Climate Change Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Agreement, the Trans-Pacific

Milbank, supra note 8.
Slaughter originated this term in opposition to what she considered to be the fiction
of unitary statehood. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 172, at 12-13.
175 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005); Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between
International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193 (1980).
173
174
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Partnership, and the North American Free Trade Agreement.176 Globalist
scholars and commentators were predictably appalled, and there ensued “a
flurry of scholarship examining presidential power to withdraw from
international commitments.”177 The most intriguing rhetorical device used to
impugn the integrity of the Trump Administration’s plans was the suggestion
that treaties do not represent binding commitments unless and until withdrawn
from (the traditional view), but rather eternal commitments on the part of a
state which hover above the realm of its politics. This suggestion lurked in
Koh’s combative declaration in a 2017 article that, “[u]nlike Trump’s,
America’s commitment to fighting climate change is irreversible,”178 as well
as in Tess Bridgeman’s warning that “[i]f the United States cannot be counted
on to carry out our commitments when the Presidency changes political
parties, it will erode trust in future Presidents of any political party to enter
into agreements with partners.”179 The suggestion was advanced more directly
by French President Emmanuel Macron, who in the run-up to the 2018 G-7
meeting in Canada told the press:
None of us who have been elected by the people can say ‘all
prior commitments disappear.’ It’s just not true, there is a
continuity in state affairs at the heart of international laws.
Sometimes we’ve inherited some commitments that weren’t
core to our beliefs, but we stuck to them, because that is how
it works for nations. And that will be the case for the United
States—like for every great democracy.180
By weaving notions of permanence and immutability into the fabric of
conventional obligation, globalists have been able to defend a highly specific
substantive-law status quo under the guise of defending “the rules-based,
interconnected international order.”181 If commitments contained in

176 See Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administration and the
‘Unmaking’ of International Agreements, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 443 (2018).
177 Id.
178 Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56
WASHBURN L.J. 413, 436 (2017).
179 Tess Bridgeman, Paris Is a Binding Agreement: Here’s Why That Matters, JUST
SECURITY (June 4, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/41705/paris-binding-agreement-m
atters/.
180 Tyler Durden, “The Old Order Is Over”: Trump To “Confront” G-7 As Macron Plans
On “Standing Up” To US President, ZEROHEDGE (June 7, 2018), https://www.zerohedg
e.com/news/2018-06-07/trump-plans-adopting-confrontational-tone-g-7-response-g-6-pre
ssure.
181 Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 443; see also id. at 459 (“[I]f our foreign partners
feel that they can no longer rely upon the United States . . . to keep its international
commitments, the foundations of that order are threatened”); Koh, supra note 178, at 418
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international agreements are “meant” to be fixed and stable, then withdrawing
from such agreements necessarily equates to “gratuitously break[ing]”
international law182 and taking a box cutter to rule of law values.183 This is
apparently the case even if withdrawal is attempted in accordance with a
treaty’s own terms (e.g. the Paris Agreement), and even if the entire agreement
was expressly concluded as a nonbinding political commitment (e.g. the Iran
Nuclear Agreement).184 On this logic, a new leader’s rejection of a previous
leader’s responses to complex international regulatory challenges is as lawless
as a declaration of intent to wage aggressive war; in either case the new leader
is threatening the “universal rights . . . that form much of the foundation of
modern international law.”185 And since no sane and balanced person would
issue such a threat, much less act on it, any leader who does do so, namely
President Trump, must suffer from some type of psychological disorder.
Nativist tendencies? Undoubtedly.186 A mercurial and capricious
temperament? Very likely.187 A will-to-power188 that must be resisted189 at all
costs? Most certainly.
But whose temperament and judgment are questionable here? I suggest not
the President’s. Surely the globalist commentators cited above would, in their
calmer moments, concede that treaty commitments—even ones reflecting
core principles of international public policy, such as the Geneva Conventions
and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—are generally deemed revocable,

(suggesting that nations that do not adhere to “existing, recognizable legal frameworks”
act “based on power or expedience alone”).
182 Koh, supra note 178, at 419.
183 See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 459 (implying that Trump’s decisions to
terminate U.S. involvement in Obama-era agreements herald “a return to a global order
that is a Hobbesian free-for-all, where power is the only arbiter”); Koh, supra note 178, at
420 (“The Trump approach . . . claims that there are no rules that bind our conduct.”).
184 See KENNETH KATZMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44942 U.S. DECISION TO
CEASE IMPLEMENTING THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nu
ke/R44942 (“[O]fficials in the Obama Administration asserted that the JPCOA is a
nonbinding political commitment, and Trump Administration officials continued that
assertion.”) (citation omitted).
185 Koh, supra note 178, at 420.
186 See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 443 (claiming the Trump Administration is
motivated by a desire “to scrub the U.S. body politic clean of what it appears to view as
pesky ‘foreign’ entanglements”).
187 See id. at 459 (implying that Trump’s withdrawal decisions were “born not from a
genuine response to changed conditions, but from arbitrary and capricious impulse.”); Koh,
supra note 178, at 420 (describing Trump as “mercurial”).
188 See Koh, supra note 178, at 419 (describing Trump as a “willful president arriving at
the White House with a self-proclaimed radical agenda to change how America engages
the world.”).
189 See id. at 442 (“The main message is that the Trump Administration does not own our
climate policy. We all do. . . . There are many resisters, and many ways to resist”).
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not eternal.190 And they are deemed revocable for one simple and compelling
reason: They serve a state’s self-interests, perceptions of which can change.
Indeed, treaty-making has traditionally been understood as an exercise in what
Anderson calls “sovereign state multilateralism,”191 a process of horizontal
interaction in which the extent, type, and duration of multilateral cooperation
rests, ultimately, within each state’s judgment.192 To suggest that treaties
represent instead a type of irrevocable Hobbesian social contract, or that a
state acts lawlessly in availing itself of express or implied exit rights, or that
the rule of law brooks no changes of mind or of course, is essentially to say
that nation-states and their citizenries exist to serve the international order, not
the other way around. The problem with that proposition is, I think, obvious.
Additionally, there is the pesky issue of democracy when treaty
withdrawal is motivated—as it can be in a democracy—not by a change in
material external circumstances but in the internal distribution of political
power. While campaigning for the presidency in 2016, President Trump made
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement an important campaign pledge. 193
While his solid victory in the Electoral College (his 306 votes to Clinton’s
232194) concededly cannot be interpreted as a mandate on any specific
platform plank, it did lend his subsequent withdrawal decision substantial
democratic legitimacy—more than enough, I should think, to take it out of the
category of Dauphin-esque whim that some globalists would cast it in.195
While I do not doubt the sincerity of globalists’ belief that President Trump’s

190 This is evidenced by both the widespread use of express withdrawal clauses and the
fairly routine recognition of implied rights of withdrawal based on treaty subject matter.
See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 204.
191 See Anderson, supra note 18, at 1262.
192 Sovereign state multilateralism reflects Kant’s vision of global governance, viz. a law
of nations founded on a federation of free states interacting with each other on the basis of
shared assessments of mutual interests. See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795). Koh invokes Kant against the Trump Administration. See
Koh, supra note 178, at 466-67. But unless Kant can be read as endorsing an international
hive mind, this invocation is inapt.
193 See Jamie Fly, Trump’s Unsurprising Rejection of the Paris Climate Agreement (June
5, 2017), http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2017/06/05/trumps-unsurprising-rejection-paris-cli
mate-agreement (“As a candidate, Trump was very clear on the campaign trail about his
intention to scrap the agreement. The Republican platform in Cleveland last summer was
explicit as well”); Koh, supra note 19, at 355 (“During the 2016 presidential campaign,
President-Elect Donald Trump promised to ‘cancel’ the Paris Agreement.”) (citation
omitted).
194 Presidential
Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president (last updated Aug. 9, 2017,
9:00 AM).
195 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 178, at 442 (“The environmental community and the global
commitment to clean energy are far bigger than Donald Trump.”); id. at 465 (“A new
president cannot simply have his way.”).

122

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L

[Vol. 48:85

withdrawal decision disserves the national interest,196 it would seem that an
election-winning percentage of United States voters disagreed with that
assessment. Surely it is their judgment that matters and that deserves respect,
is it not?197
ii.

Word Games, Calendar Chicanery and Other Shenanigans

When not trying to replace the traditional concept of the treaty with
something more philosophically radical, globalist scholars and their allies
have resorted to a host of gimmicks and tricks designed to make international
agreements stickier (i.e. easier for states to enter and harder to leave).
Regarding ease of entry, the key tactic has been circumvention of those
national authorities—usually the legislature—that tend to be skeptical of
international commitment. In recent years circumvention has been attempted
in several different ways. One has been to couch the most consequential
provisions of an agreement in non-mandatory language (e.g. replacing
“shalls” with “shoulds”). This allows characterization of an agreement as a
mere political/diplomatic commitment on the part of a state by its executive,
not a legally binding, contractual obligation requiring legislative approval.198
A second way has been to use two articles of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties199—Articles 18 and 25—to procure state compliance with
treaty provisions at the point of executive signature instead of legislative
ratification. Article 18 has been used as a stick,200 Article 25 as a carrot,201
See, e.g., Amirfar & Singh, supra note 176, at 443.
In this vein, President Macron might wish to reconsider the advisability of invoking
the concept of democracy to criticize a democratically-blessed geostrategic decision.
198 See Koh, supra note 19, at 346. Koh writes:
If the international commitment being assumed is only political, and
neither new, legally binding, nor domestically enforceable, the
obligations being created are diplomatic, not contractual, and can
lawfully be made by the President alone, operating against a broad
background of legislative acceptance . . . .
Id. The wording of the emissions-cap provisions in the Paris Agreement exemplifies this
strategic use of language. See Bridgeman, supra note 179 (“The Paris Agreement, having
been carefully negotiated by experienced actors over an extended time period, is certainly
an example of such exacting scrutiny in the choice of words.”); Koh, supra note 19, at 352.
199 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
200 Article 18 states that a nation that signs a treaty is “obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose” of the treaty “until it shall have made its intention
clear not to become a party to the treaty.” Id. art. 18. Puras invoked Article 18 in arguing
that the United States is legally bound to secure to its citizens the rights enumerated in the
ICESCR. See Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 3. For a discussion of some of the scholarship
that supports Puras’s position, see Bradley, supra note 44, at 315-16.
201 Article 25(1) permits nations “to have a treaty apply provisionally even before they
have ratified it—for example, based on a provision in the treaty that is triggered by
196
197
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and each to the same effect: reducing the act of ratification vel non to the status
of either a quasi-formality at best202 or a nullity at worst.203 Yet a third way
has been to ignore any “inconvenient” understandings that a national
legislature may have regarding the nature of the treaty commitments it does
agree to adopt. Alston went down this road when he interpreted the CERD as
declaring socio-economic rights instead of simply prohibiting discrimination
relative to their optional exercise.204 Puras went down it as well when he
advanced, as against the Trump Administration’s Obamacare-repeal plans, a
disparate-impact claim based on the CERD205 that the ratifying Senate had
expressly discountenanced.206 Each of these three ways of circumventing the
national legislature is problematic, and it behooves us to pause and consider
precisely why.
The calculated use of non-mandatory language has been billed as a way to
increase state participation in international agreements. Bridgeman write
apropos the Paris Agreement: “[A]llowing parties to set their own emissions
targets was intended to encourage broad participation among states and
incentivize maximum ambition.”207 But framing the matter this way
obfuscates more than it clarifies, for it ignores the crucial issue of whether
signature, or in a separate agreement.” Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1238.
Article 25(2) provides for the termination of this provisional effect if and when a signatory
state decides not to become a party to the treaty. See id.
202 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2000) (citation
omitted). Aust writes:
It is sometimes argued that a state which has not yet ratified a treaty must,
in accordance with Article 18, nevertheless comply with it, or, at least,
do nothing inconsistent with its provisions. The argument is clearly
wrong, since the act of ratification would then have no purpose because
the obligation to perform the treaty would not then be dependent on
ratification.
Id.
203 Two examples illustrate this point: (1) Some commentators argued that, by virtue of
its earlier signature, the United States had an obligation to avoid testing nuclear weapons
under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, even though the U.S. Senate had
previously rejected the Treaty. See Bradley, supra note 44, at 315-16. (2) In 2013, President
Obama signed the ATT despite substantial opposition to it in the Senate. The ATT provides
that “[a]ny State may at the time of signature . . . declare that it will apply provisionally
Article 6 and Article 7 pending the entry into force of this Treaty for that State.” ATT,
supra note 121, at art. 23. Some senators feared that the Obama Administration would avail
itself of this provision to implement the ATT before the Senate could render its own
(presumably negative) judgment via its advice-and-consent role. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 45, at 1239-40 n.171.
204 See supra note 12.
205 See Puras Letter, supra note 1, at 2-3.
206 See Senate Report, supra note 12, at 30 (expressing the understanding that the CERD
prohibited only those fiscal and social policies that could be shown to be motivated by
discriminatory animus).
207 Bridgeman, supra note 179.
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greater state participation is secured by respecting the exercise of sovereign
state choice or by marginalizing it. The VCLT’s forgiving and flexible regime
regarding the acceptability of treaty reservations is an example of the former
manner of securing broad state participation;208 the strategic choice of modal
verb forms in the Paris Agreement, of the latter. Wrote one reporter: “The
U.S. had insisted throughout the negotiating process that the [Paris] deal not
include any legally binding language that would have required the White
House to submit it to the Senate for approval.”209 Indeed, when Koh described
the Paris Agreement as the culmination of a “daring change in [the] diplomatic
approach to international treaty commitments” which was made in response
to the U.S. Senate’s previous rejection of the Kyoto Protocol,210 he was subtly
confirming that Paris’s architects sought to avoid the possibility of Senate
rejection by avoiding, rather than by satisfying, the Senate.211
If we wish for further proof on this point we shall find it in the asymmetry
that characterizes the entry and exit attributes of these ostensibly political
commitments. Logic dictates that such commitments be easy to revoke or
ignore by the sole entity (the executive) that made them. From a
sovereigntist’s perspective, such exit flexibility would go some way toward
compensating for the exclusion of the national legislature on the question of
entry. However, if the Paris Agreement is any indication, executive-driven
exit may be anything but quick or easy. The withdrawal provisions of that
Agreement were carefully crafted to ensure that anti-Paris factions in the
United States would have to win two Presidential elections, not just one, in
order to take the United States out. As Koh has explained (with evident
satisfaction):
The Paris Agreement only recognizes withdrawal under the
terms specified in the Agreement’s text, which plainly declares
that a party cannot give note of withdrawal to the U.N.
Secretary General until “three years from the date on which
this Agreement has entered into force.” Since the Paris
208 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE
L.J. 485, 500-06 (2002).
209 Joshua Keating, The One Word That Almost Scuttled the Climate Deal, SLATE (Dec.
14, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/12/climate-deal-came-down-to-the-di
fference-between-shall-and-should.html.
210 See Koh, supra note 19, at 351.
211 Koh’s assurance that the Paris Agreement enjoyed a measure of Congressional
approval because it was concluded against the backdrop of prior Congressional
authorizations to the executive branch to tackle the problems of pollution and climate
change is undermined by his acknowledgement that the Paris Agreement was one of the
two “most important and controversial diplomatic arrangements of the Obama
Administration.” Id. at 349 (emphasis added). See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
45, at 1252 (noting that the Paris Agreement was concluded “in the face of congressional
opposition”) and id. at n.235.
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Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, the
earliest date that the U.S. could even give such legal notice
would be November 4, 2019. That notification would then take
another year to take legal effect, meaning that Trump cannot
legally withdraw the U.S. from the Agreement until November
4, 2020, the day after the next U.S. presidential election. Until
then, Trump’s withdrawal announcement has no more legal
meaning than one of his tweets.212
The image of American negotiators working with foreign governments to
create ways to insulate an agreement from the disapproving judgment of the
American electorate is, I submit, a deeply disturbing one. Yet surprisingly,
some commentators claim to see in such calendar chicanery a validation of
democracy rather than its rather obvious insult. Bridgeman, for example, has
written:
This four-year minimum timeline is crucial in light of the
intense domestic debate on the merits of staying in the
Agreement: it sets up the November 2020 U.S. election as a
referendum of sorts on whether the United States should
indeed follow through with Trump’s announced
withdrawal.213
Bridgeman overlooks the fact that, for reasons explained above,214 the
2016 presidential election already served as a “referendum of sorts” on the
wisdom of the Paris Agreement—a referendum seemingly lost by Paris
proponents. Suffice it to say that democracy has not traditionally been
understood to allow for successive rounds of voting until the desired outcome
is achieved. To make matters worse, pro-Paris factions and scholars have
come up with a range of claims and tactics designed to make the Agreement
as sticky as possible as a matter of U.S. domestic law. These efforts are
surveyed in Part II.
Requiring state compliance with treaty provisions in the period prior to
legislative ratification rests on an ambitious misreading of Article 18 of the
VCLT. As Bradley has explained, based on an analysis of Article 18’s drafting
history and text, Article 18 does not require states, upon signing, to comply
with a treaty’s provisions, only to preserve those elements of the exoagreement status quo that make future compliance upon ratification possible
and meaningful.215 In other words, Article 18 seems to have been intended as

212
213
214
215

Koh, supra note 178, at 436.
Bridgeman, supra note 179.
See supra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
See Bradley, supra note 44, at 327-30.
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a garden-variety anti-fraud device meant to deter states from taking bad faith
measures that deny counter-parties the benefit(s) of their bargain.216 This
narrow construction of Article 18 is not only correct as a technical matter; it
is essential for the preservation of the voice of national legislatures and
citizenries regarding the type and scope of international commitments their
states assume.217 The danger to democracies of a broad construction of Article
18 is not lessened by the vague assurance, offered by some, that the interim
compliance obligation attaches only to core treaty provisions, not peripheral
ones.218 How “coreness” is to be assessed remains distressingly unclear. And
the danger to democracy is positively heightened when the broad construction
is paired with the strange notion, advanced by others, that an unratified treaty
cannot legally be unsigned.219 Indeed, this combination of ideas represents a
one-two doctrinal punch to the sovereignty gut: The broad construction of
Article 18 would get states easily “in” to the substantive obligations imposed
by treaties, while the alleged prohibition on unsigning would keep them from
ever getting out. States would be facing a veritable perpetual purgatory of
compliance.
The globalists’ use of VCLT Article 25 presents a somewhat different
concern. It cannot be said to rest on a misreading of that Article, as
commentators appear to agree that provisional application can in fact “bind a
nation to all or part of a treaty, not just to an obligation not to defeat its object
and purpose.”220 However, depending on the content of the treaty and the
political context, its use can certainly reflect an insensitive level of
indifference on the part of treaty negotiators to the constitutional tensions
foreseeably created at the domestic level of those signatory states that entrust
the ratification-decision to the legislature. Such indifference goes beyond the
216 As such, Article 18 would appear to be inapplicable to human-rights instruments, such
as the ICSECR, which do not typically memorialize the kinds of quid pro quo that are
vulnerable to interim-period machination. Cf. id. at 332.
217 See David H. Moore, The President’s Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 598, 631-32 (2012) (concluding that “[o]n textual, structural, and historical grounds,
the President’s assumption of interim obligations runs afoul of the Constitution”).
218 See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights
Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2003).
219 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 178, at 435-36 (citing the Bush II Administration’s
experience with the Rome Statute for the proposition that “[i]nternational law makes clear
that U.S. presidents cannot simply delete prior signatures from treaties”). This argument
has little merit. In signing a treaty, a democratic nation expresses, via its executive, an
intent to deliberate and reach a decision regarding ratification via formal proceedings
usually involving the legislature in some capacity. The act of unsigning is simply the
expression of a counter-intent (i.e. no deliberation will occur because there is no possibility
that binding consent to the treaty will be granted). Such reversal is expressly contemplated
by Article 18 itself when it refers to a point at which a state makes “its intention clear not
to become a party to the treaty.” At this point, Article 18 tells us, the interim obligation
ceases because the interim period itself has collapsed.
220 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1238.
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posture of mere neutrality that international law customarily adopts regarding
the manner in which states meet their international commitments. And
indifference is not necessarily the worst of it. The use of Article 25 can also
represent a rather cynical ploy to give key pro-globalist executive branch
officials the legal hook they need to implement agreements having
controversial domestic ramifications against the wishes of their legislatures.
The ATT, prior to its 2019 unsigning by President Trump, arguably
exemplified this ploy. As noted above, the ATT contains a provisional
application provision that aroused the suspicions of some U.S. Senators as to
the unilateral intentions of the Obama Administration.221 Opposition to the
ATT in Congress was widespread and rooted in concern over the ATT’s
impact on Second Amendment gun rights222—a concern that neither the
ATT’s drafters nor the pro-gun-control Obama Administration seemed to
share.223 While it is true that provisional application is sometimes limited “to
obligations not inconsistent with each country’s domestic law,”224 this
limitation does little to preserve a legislature’s ratification voice in cases
where the obligation either is new in nature (and thus not reflected in extant
domestic law) or burdens, but does not outright violate, domestic rights or
privileges (the Second Amendment scenario). The only failsafe way to limit
mischief in these two cases is to amend Article 25 to clarify that provisional
application is available as a matter of international law only if it is consistent
with a signatory state’s domestic constitutional processes, not substantive law.
We come, finally, to Alston’s and Puras’s decisions to publicly interpret
the CERD in ways that ran counter to the clear understanding of the ratifying
Senate. While that Senate might be chided for not including its understandings
in its package of RUDs to the CERD, certainly jurisdictional comity does not
normally depend on the fulfilment of such formalities. This is especially true
given, in Alston’s case, the U.S. Senate’s determined refusal to ratify the
ICESCR and, in Puras’s case, the highly controversial nature of the reading
he was advancing. Even the most ardent promoters of the CERD, such as

See supra note 203.
See Larry Bell, The U.N. Arms Trade Treaty: Are Our 2nd Amendment Rights Part
Of The Deal? FORBES (July 10, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/07/10/t
he-u-n-arms-trade-treaty-are-our-2nd-amendment-rights-part-of-the-deal/#21d7f3b86c20
(detailing congressional opposition).
223 See ATT, supra note 121, preamble (acknowledging the legitimacy of ownership and
use of conventional weapons for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities,
but omitting reference to self-defensive activities); Diana D’Abruzzo, ‘It’s Got to Stop’:
17 Times Obama Has Pushed for Stronger Gun Control, POLITICO (Aug. 26, 2015), https://
www.politico.com/gallery/2015/08/its-got-to-stop-15-times-obama-has-pushed-for-strong
er-gun-control-002064?slide=0.
224 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1239.
221
222
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Meron, put forward the disparate impact argument only tentatively, in
recognition of the enormity of its implications.225
But I would make a larger point here, which is that, more than anything
else, Alston’s and Puras’s moves reflect a tendency on the part of globalists
to try to capture the castle cheaply via definitional and interpretive fiat. I have
previously noted the manipulation of categories and labels done for the
purpose of immunizing certain favored customary norms against persistent
objection.226 We have seen French President Macron suggest a novel use of
the word democracy in a bid to immortalize treaty commitments. 227 And
Puras’s redefinition of “discrimination” to include non-invidious disparate
impact seems nothing if not small potatoes compared to the globalists’
wholesale redefinition of “sovereignty” twenty years ago228 in a bid to
legitimize a new international duty of humanitarian intervention—the
“Responsibility to Protect”—that was destined to thoroughly wreck one state
(Libya)229 and threaten the health and well-being of another (Syria).230 The
bottom line is that globalists appreciate the power and malleability of words
and have not hesitated to harness both to advance the Sources Project at the
international level.
III. PART II: QUOD EST INFERIUS EST SICUT QUOD EST SUPERIUS: THE
SOURCES PROJECT AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL
If the aim of the Sources Project at the international level has been the
creation of universally binding international obligations despite the opposition
of dissenting states, its aim at the domestic level has been to secure states’
compliance with such obligations despite the opposition of national political
branches concerned to preserve the prerogatives of sovereignty. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the same two tactics that have been deployed at the
international level are evident at the domestic level: (1) Using CIL as a tool
225 See Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 283, 289-90 (1985).
226 See supra note 127.
227 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
228 Sovereignty was redefined from sovereignty-as-control (i.e. the right of a state
government to exercise exclusive control over state territory and people) to sovereigntyas-responsibility (i.e. a state government forfeits exclusive control over state territory and
people if it fails to protect them from, or subjects them to, mass atrocities). See Gareth
Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Int’l Comm’n on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (Dec. 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%
20Report.pdf. The world was assured that this redefinition implied “no transfer or dilution
of state sovereignty,” only a “necessary re-characterization.” Id. at 13 ¶ 2.4.
229 See Amy Baker Benjamin, To Wreck a State: The New International Crime, 19 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 208 (2016).
230 See Amy Baker Benjamin, Syria: The Unbearable Lightness of Intervention, 35 WIS.
J. INT’L L. 515 (2018).
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of internalization when the use of treaties is blocked or blunted; and (2)
enhancing treaties themselves as a tool of internalization by changing the
secondary rules that regulate how they acquire domestic legal effect. Quod est
inferius est sicut quod est superius.231 I shall discuss each tactic in turn, using
the United States as the case study.
A. CIL to the Rescue of Unratified and Unimplemented Treaties
As the presidency of Jimmy Carter—a “governmental norm sponsor[]”
according to Koh232—was nearing its end in the late 1970s, it was becoming
clear that the U.S. Senate either would not ratify the large and growing body
of international human rights treaties or would ratify them subject to RUDs
that rendered them unenforceable as domestic law. Globalist legal scholars
were predictably appalled and began casting about for a way to get such
treaties “in” despite this limitation. Hence the genesis in or around 1980 of
what Bradley and Goldsmith later chose to call the Modern Position: the claim
that the treaty-mimicking corpus of CIL, or parts thereof, qualified as postErie233 federal common law which was (1) binding on the fifty states by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause; (2) binding on the President by virtue of the Take
Care Clause; (3) potentially binding on the U.S Congress, as respects any prior
inconsistent federal legislation, by virtue of the “last in time” rule; and (4)
potentially binding on the U.S. Congress, as respects any subsequent
inconsistent federal legislation, by virtue of the allegedly constitutional status
of CIL norms.234 Critics of the Modern Position charged—and some
proponents freely conceded—that it was devised to enable “federal courts to
accomplish through the back door of CIL what the political branches have
prohibited through the front door of treaties.”235 In other words, what we had
in the Modern Position was an attempt to reprise at the domestic level Prosper
Weil’s nightmare—a campaign to cleverly outflank that which could not be
frontally assaulted.
The Modern Position was problematic for a number of reasons well
documented in the literature. It represented a clear affront to the democratic
processes of the federal government. It reflected a crude cherry-picking of the
attributes of the “new” federal common law that Erie had paved the way for,
eagerly claiming for CIL the status of supreme federal law while disregarding
Erie’s requirement that any such law be authorized in some fashion by the

“That which is below is like that which is above.”
Koh, supra note 105, at 1410.
233 Erie R.R. Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
234 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 322-23 & n.20 (discussing the various
versions of the Modern Position).
235 Id. at 331; see also id. at 330-31 & n.62.
231
232
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U.S. Constitution or federal legislation.236 It was illogical: Why should CIL
norms be self-executing in the U.S. judicial system when treaty norms, which
enjoy far greater democratic legitimacy owing to the Senate’s advice and
consent role, are not?237 It was, finally, frightening in its implications. When
one combined the liberal rules of modern CIL-formation238 with the most
ambitious versions of the Modern Position,239 the possibility opened up that,
as a matter of domestic rules of recognition, politically-unaccountable NSAs
could play a role in nullifying the statutory work-product of the U.S.
Congress.240
Fortunately, a great deal of wind was taken out of the sails of the Modern
Position by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.241
Whatever else Sosa may stand for—and there is disagreement242—it made
reasonably clear that CIL norms that do not enjoy the support of the U.S.
Congress are unlikely to be deemed self-executing in legal actions before the
federal courts. In what may have been the most consequential moment of its
opinion, the Sosa Court indicated a reluctance to entertain, as possible sources
of self-executing CIL, international instruments that Congress either considers
to be aspirational in nature (viz. the UDHR) or has left unimplemented (viz.
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).243 Anyone who
understands the overarching rationale of the Modern Position will understand
the significance of the Court’s reluctance on this point.
Following Sosa there appear to be only two ways in which globalists can
make use of CIL to engineer U.S. compliance with treaty norms that have
been rejected or left unimplemented by the Senate (or by Congress as a
whole). One way is to convince a sympathetic President to recognize and
accept such norms as CIL. Presidents have done this with respect to several
236 See id. at 324 (“To be consistent with the requirements of Erie . . . [the] new federal
common law must be authorized in some fashion by the U.S. Constitution or a federal
statute”) (citation omitted).
237 Indeed, if a democratic state opts for being half-monist and half-dualist, logic would
seem to demand monism for treaties and dualism for CIL.
238 See supra Part I.A.ii.
239 See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6,
95, 338-43 (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that some CIL rules have the status of U.S. constitutional
law and therefore trump even subsequent inconsistent federal legislation).
240 The more restrained proponents of the Modern Position trotted out the well-worn
“trust us, we won’t go that far” pledge to assuage concerns on this point. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 330. The assurance left critics like Bradley and Goldsmith
unpersuaded, and for good reason: Historically, trust has not figured as an acceptable basis
for delegating power to government officials. See id.; Benjamin, supra note 50, at 12-15
(discussing the “distrust principle” at the heart of the American constitutional order).
241 Sosa, 512 U.S. at 734-35.
242 See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 871-73
(2007).
243 Sosa, 512 U.S. at 734-35.
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conventions,244 and time will tell whether greater use of this tactic is made and
condoned in the future. It is an interesting and open question whether such
presidential recognition would constitute political branch endorsement
sufficient to satisfy Erie’s test for federal common law and thereby permit a
CIL norm’s enforcement via private lawsuits brought in federal court. I
suspect it would not, as presidential directive is plainly neither Constitution
nor federal statute.245 A second way to still use CIL is to persuade the Supreme
Court to take CIL norms into account when interpreting provisions of the U.S.
Constitution. This tactic has also been used with some success, 246 no doubt
due to the presence on the Court of what Koh has called a “transnationalist
faction” of justices who are prepared to serve as a “critical link between the
international and the domestic legal spheres” and who “use their interpretive
powers to promote the development of a global legal system.”247 But getting
customary norms “in” via the Constitution ultimately depends on the
availability of colorably serviceable constitutional text—a stubborn fact likely
to limit the utility of this tactic to the globalist agenda going forward.
B. International Agreements Without Congress: A Primer
In addition to attempting to use CIL as a collateral device for getting treaty
norms “in,” globalist scholars have tried to rework the secondary
internalization rules relating directly to treaties themselves. Henkin, for
example, was for many years at the forefront of a movement to win the
judiciary over to the view that non-self-executing treaty declarations offend
the spirit of the Constitution and might be unconstitutional. He stated his case
in a 1995 article for the American Journal of International Law:
Article VI of the Constitution provides expressly for
lawmaking by treaty: treaties are declared to be the supreme
law of the land. The Framers intended that a treaty should
become law ipso facto, when the treaty is made; it should not
require legislative implementation to convert it into United

244 See Eric Talbot Jensen, Presidential Pronouncements of Customary International
Law as an Alternative to the Senate’s Advice and Consent, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1525,
1528 (2015).
245 It would also seem to be an open question whether Presidents have the power to direct
executive agencies to follow the provisions of their unilaterally recognized CIL and to
prescribe domestic legal ramifications for failure to do so.
246 In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Supreme Court took arguments against
the juvenile death penalty that long had been made under CIL and accepted them in its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.
247 Koh, supra note 171, at 748-49.
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States law. In effect, lawmaking by treaty was to be an
alternative to legislation by Congress.248
Henkin believed that if ever there was proof of American hypocrisy
respecting international law (i.e. international law is for them, not us), the nonself-executing declarations favored by the Senate were it.249 And one can
certainly understand his frustration; rights without legal remedies are usually
not worth very much. On the other hand, Henkin was insensitive to the
implications of his argument. While it is true that the Framers did not
“contemplate[] that some treaties might not be law of the land,”250 neither
could they have contemplated the possibility of a world in which international
law would seek to intrude so deeply into the political culture and jurisdiction
of nation-states via the modern human rights movement. The self-execution
of treaties in the era of classical international law posed little threat to the
power and prerogatives of the U.S. House of Representatives (which is shut
out of the constitutionally prescribed treaty ratification process) because that
law confined itself largely to interstate matters. However, in our current era
of intrastate-focused international law, self-execution poses a substantial
threat, for obvious reasons. Henkin’s argument also ran afoul of basic
doctrinal logic. If as a matter of domestic law the Senate can reject a treaty
altogether, then surely it ought to be able to approve it subject to limiting
conditions like non-self-execution. Surely the greater power includes the
lesser. If it did not, the federal courts would not proceed with the caution they
do in inferring private causes of action from domestic statutes prescribing
domestic rules of conduct. The Sosa Court affirmed as much, albeit in the
context of considering the self-execution of CIL instead of treaties.251 The
bottom line is that Henkin’s complaint, however understandable as a political
statement, missed the mark widely as a legal one.252
Any doubt on this score was removed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Medellin v. Texas,253 which was to Henkin’s argument what Sosa had been to
the Modern Position: a large bucket of cold water, liberally poured. The
Medellin Court not only did not think that the Constitution requires most
treaties to be deemed self-executing;254 it also appeared to endorse a
presumption against self-execution which can be overcome only if there is
clear evidence in treaty text or structure that the treaty was intended to be self248 Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346 (1995).
249 See id. at 348.
250 Id. at 346.
251 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28.
252 For a more detailed response to Henkin on this issue, see Bradley, supra note 208, at
544-48.
253 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
254 See id. at 504-06.
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executing by the Senate that ratified it.255 In opting for this originalist
approach—which was the opposite of Henkin’s vision—the Court rejected as
“novel” 256 and “arrestingly indeterminate” 257 the more internationally
minded test for self-execution proposed by Justice Breyer, which would have
substituted judicial assessment of the benefits of self-execution in any given
case for the ratifying Senate’s own historical judgment.258 The Court also
rejected, as constitutionally irrelevant and ineffective, the “unprecedented
action”259 of the George W. Bush Administration in seeking to implement
unilaterally, via executive order, the non-self-executing treaty commitment at
issue in the case (which Congress had chosen to leave unimplemented).260
This ruling not only preserved Congress’s exclusive gate-keeping role
apropos non-self-executing treaties; it also implicitly cast doubt on the claim,
discussed above,261 that the President can constitutionally cause the United
States to comply with the provisions of unratified treaties under color of
Articles 18 or 25 of the VCLT.
One might think that, following Medellin, globalist legal scholars would
have felt some hesitation in arguing for expanded presidential power (vis-àvis Congress) over the nation’s international lawmaking. Yet nothing could
be further from the truth. During the eight years that followed Medellin—
years that coincided with the two-term Obama Presidency—globalists bid
several novel theories designed to justify the President in entering the United
States into international agreements without much, if any, congressional
255 “[W]hile treaties may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic
law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys
an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.” Id. at 505 (citing
Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F. 3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 514.
I say the Court appeared to endorse a rebuttable presumption against self-execution
because the facts it relied on for its ruling did not fit such a test. The Court concluded that
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter was not self-executing based on evidence of non-selfexecutive intent on the part of the Senate rather than on a lack of evidence of self-executive
intent. See id. at 509 (“The U.N. Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic—that is,
nonjudicial—remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments were not meant to be
enforceable in domestic courts”).
256 Id. at 515.
257 Id.
258 See id. at 555-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court’s majority was unmoved by
Justice Breyer’s seeming appeal for trust in assuring the nation that the new power he was
proposing would be exercised in a responsible manner. See id. at 516 (“Nor is it any answer
to say that the federal courts will diligently police international agreements and enforce the
decisions of international tribunals only when they should be enforced”) (emphasis in
original).
259 Id. at 532 (adopting the Bush II Administration’s own characterization) (internal
quotations omitted).
260 See id. at 523-32.
261 See supra notes 199-203, 215-224 and accompanying text.
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involvement. There was, to begin with, the “new” theory that came to be
known in the literature as “Executive Agreements+”.262 Executive
Agreements+ holds that the President can conclude a legally binding
international agreement on virtually any subject, regardless of whether it is
committed mostly to the care of Congress under Article I of the Constitution,
provided the agreement advances or is consistent with policy goals adopted
by Congress in purely domestic legislation.263 The Obama Administration
deployed Executive Agreements+ in justifying its unilateral ratification—
under cover of the darkness created by the 2013 government shutdown—of
the Minamata Convention on Mercury, a comprehensive international
agreement concerning the production, use, and disposal of the chemical. 264
Non-globalist scholars were left shaking their heads at the brazenness of this
presidential power grab, with Bradley and Goldsmith opining that it was
“difficult to overstate the breadth of this purported authority . . . .”265
When ex ante congressional authorization was felt to be needed by the
Obama Administration, it was reverse-engineered in a disingenuous fashion
that might be called “Fake Authorization.” Administration lawyers, signed
treaty text already in hand, would scour the U.S. Code looking for any statute
that might plausibly be read to allow for the conclusion of the international
agreement in question.266 Led by Koh as then-State Department Legal
Adviser, the Obama Administration attempted Fake Authorization with
respect to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)267—again
provoking expressions of surprise and consternation on the part of members
of the legal academy, some of whom reached out to Congress and warned it
not to let itself be used in this manner.268 The scholars wrote:
The present issue reaches far beyond the topical matters
covered by ACTA, into the fundamental Constitutional issue
of separation of powers. If Congress allows the Executive to
claim that ACTA was authorized by language that clearly does

262 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1267 (“The very theory of Executive
Agreements+ is new . . .”).
263 See id. at 1266; Daniel Bodansky & Peter Shapiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 915 (2016).
264 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1216, 1267.
265 Id. at 1266.
266 Although one can only speculate, this scouring likely took place in the context of the
State Department’s non-public “Circular 175 procedure.” See id. at 1209 n.16. The use of
the word “circular” to describe this process would seem most apt.
267 See id. at 1217.
268 See Letter from Legal Academics to Members of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Finance (May 16, 2012), https://perma.cc/ZE8F-UXRK.
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not authorize the agreement, it will be ceding unprecedented
power to the Executive.269
In truth, it does not take much thought to discern that if members of Congress
would be surprised to learn from State Department lawyers that Congress had
authorized the conclusion of an international agreement, then Congress did
not do so.
Then there was the Obama Administration’s “significant constitutional
innovation”270 of marrying a President’s international political-commitment
authority with pre-existing statutory delegations that give those commitments
the possibility of legal teeth under domestic law.271 The Paris Agreement
epitomized this combination. President Obama’s internationally nonbinding
political pledge regarding the United States’ emissions reductions was
implemented via existing regulatory authorities that had been delegated by
Congress years before for different, albeit related purposes.272 Bradley and
Goldsmith label this move a “consequential political commitment,”273 but I
prefer to call it “Henkin’s Revenge,” for it represents a sly form of payback
by the globalists for the Senate’s long-time habit of turning the nation’s
international legal obligations into domestic political commitments via the use
of the non-self-execution declaration. And while Bradley and Goldsmith
perceive no real danger in Henkin’s Revenge as a constitutional matter,274 I
am not nearly as sanguine.
The Paris Agreement is best categorized as an executive agreement made
pursuant to treaty, the treaty being the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992.275 The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee “expressed the expectation that future
agreements that would require legally binding emissions reductions . . . would
require the Senate’s advice and consent.”276 But there are two levels on which
Id. (emphasis added).
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1219.
271 Id. at 1252.
272 See id. at 1250, 1252, 1269.
273 Id. at 1269.
274 The authors write:
Although this new use of the political-commitment authority raises
important policy issues, it is difficult to see why it is unlawful. Both the
President’s power over political commitments and the President’s power
to exercise power delegated from Congress in the domestic realm are
well established. Without significantly more argumentation, it is not
clear why two presidential authorities that separately are not legally
controversial are unconstitutional when combined.
Id. at 1270.
275 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1268-69.
276 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1268.
269
270
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an international agreement can be legally binding—the international and the
domestic—and I see no reason to confine the Senate’s expectations regarding
future agreements under the UNFCCC to the former level. After all, the
legally binding nature of agreements on the international plane can mean quite
little due to the international system’s overall lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms. What really matters is the legal nature of any domestic impact
of such agreements. In this key sense the Paris Agreement, including President
Obama’s emissions pledge, has borne deep legal consequences for the United
States. The administrative regulations enacted by the Obama Administration
to implement the pledge—such as the Clean Power Plan277—legally bind
firms and persons in the United States. They also legally bind Congress in the
sense that Congress will have to take affirmative legislative steps in order to
get rid of them. It will have to either rescind the underlying statutory
delegations or amend them to clarify that they may not be used as a basis to
implement unilateral presidential political pledges. Either action will be
burdened by the usual inertia and collective-action barriers, as well as by
potential presidential veto.278 Finally, pro-Paris groups, led in the academy by
Koh, have vowed to do their utmost to ensure that the Obama-era regulations
legally bind any future President who might seek to disturb them. It is beyond
ironic that in the very same 2017 article in which he emphasized the purely
political nature of the emissions pledge,279 and cited it as justification for
President Obama’s unilateral ratification of the Paris Agreement,280 Koh
warned the Trump Administration of the likelihood of litigation on multiple
fronts should it attempt to rescind or slow walk the Paris regulatory effort. 281
Koh has also claimed that President Trump lacks the constitutional authority
to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement without Congress’s
approval.282 This is an astonishing suggestion, also backed by a litigation
See id. at 1252 n.234.
Interestingly, legislative inertia and collective-action barriers were cited in the preSosa literature as reasons for rejecting the Modern Position. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note
27, at 247.
279 See Koh, supra note 19, at 364-65, 367.
280 See id. at 350-51.
281 See id. at 358 (“Should a Trump EPA back away from supporting the Clean Power
Plan, litigation would almost certainly ensue.”); id. at 359 (“[A]lternative, nonfederal
stakeholders will almost surely generate an alternative plan of litigation and emissions
reduction designed to keep U.S. emissions within striking distance of the promised U.S.
Nationally Determined Contribution”); see also Koh, supra note 178, at 437
(“[B]ureaucratic stickiness and external litigation have slowed the pace of domestic
dismantling of our Paris commitments.”); id. at 438 (“An overt effort by the Trump
Administration to discard the [Clean Power Plan] would undoubtedly trigger new fights
about notice-and-comment rulemaking before the D.C. Circuit. . . . Should the Trump
Administration attempt other changes, domestic litigation seems inevitable.”).
282 Koh writes:
If, in November 2019, the Administration should unilaterally give notice
of its intent to withdraw from Paris, new litigation would almost certainly
277
278
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threat, that rests on the unsound logic that a President may not unilaterally
undo what his predecessor unilaterally did.283
In sum, the Paris Agreement represents a situation in which one President
has unilaterally pledged the nation to serious international undertakings in
areas outside core Article II responsibilities and—owing to the pledge’s
domestic legal teeth—neither Congress nor a future President can easily free
the nation from that commitment. Is this merely “aggressive innovation”
(Koh’s term284) and/or “pragmatism” (Justice Beyer’s term285)? Or are we
looking instead at the unconstitutional assertion of a quasi-monarchical
prerogative? I would argue the latter and urge that we not let semantics get in
the way of clear thinking on this point. To say that an international
commitment on the part of a President is legally binding is not to say that it is
irreversible; it is only to say that it is reversible solely through legal means.
Depending on the political context, those means may be difficult to muster. It
is highly unlikely that the Senate that ratified the UNFCCC thought it was
writing a blank check for the amount of effort it, future Congresses, and future
Presidents would need to expend in order to have their contemporary political
judgments honored within our system of government. Henkin’s Revenge
therefore poses a considerable constitutional problem.
And sadly, the Paris Agreement may be but the tip of the iceberg in this
regard. However problematic and controversial its emissions cap pledge was
and remains, that pledge has at least been well known to both Congress and
the public from its inception. Many presidential political commitments of a
regulatory nature are apparently not so published and accordingly fly under
the criticism-and-accountability radar. Bradley and Goldsmith write:
Executive branch officials in the last few decades have
increasingly used political commitments to effectuate broader
and deeper regulatory cooperation between U.S. government
agencies and their foreign counterparts on a wide range of
regulatory topics. . . . There are scores of . . . examples. Taken
ensue, arguing that the President lacks constitutional power to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement without congressional participation.
Koh, supra note 178, at 439; see also Koh, supra note 19, at 358 (“Nor, as a matter of
domestic law, is it entirely clear that the President has constitutional power to withdraw
from either the Paris Agreement or the UN-FCCC without congressional participation.”).
283 Perhaps because it is so astonishing, Koh’s claim seems to have gone unnoticed by
other scholars. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1225 (noting that while
there was “significant controversy about the policy wisdom of [President Trump’s
withdrawal] decision . . . no one questioned the President’s legal authority to terminate”).
The only supportive precedent Koh cites is the inapposite Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996 (1979), which concerned President Carter’s attempt to unilaterally terminate a treaty
that had been ratified by the Senate. See Koh, supra note 19, at 358.
284 See Koh, supra note 178, at 442.
285 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, MAKING O UR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW (2011).
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together, political commitments have an enormous impact on
the everyday activities of U.S. firms and persons. But not only
are they not subject to any of the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), they are not even
published systematically or reported to Congress.286
It may surprise few to learn that the Obama Administration actively
encouraged this practice of semi-secret international rulemaking,287 which
perhaps might best be called “Secret Henkin’s Revenge.”
All told, the Obama Administration’s legal innovations went some way
toward blunting the sovereignty-protective effect of the Sosa and Medellin
rulings. The Administration was willing to (1) assume Congress’s assent to its
international agreements (Executive Agreements+); (2) fake Congress’s
assent (Fake Authorization); (3) saddle Congress with regulations
implementing agreements Congress was told it did not need to assent to
(Henkin’s Revenge); and (4) saddle the country with regulations Congress and
the public know next-to-nothing about (Secret Henkin’s Revenge). Koh
would have us believe that we face a stark choice: either allow the President
to keep his new toys or face the prospect that he will use the hard power of
the U.S. military to achieve the nation’s goals.288 Yet surely this is a false
choice (and one, I might add, that borders inappropriately on emotional
blackmail). Sovereigntists are not opposed to the conclusion of international
agreements. Nor, needless to say, are we in favor of militarism, war or
mayhem. We simply oppose the exclusion of Congress from the process of
international agreement-making. Bradley and Goldsmith appear to hope that
greater transparency regarding the President’s unilateral activities will place
Congress in a position where it can at least fight for its own inclusion.289
Perhaps–time will tell. One thing, however, is certain: From a sovereigntist’s
perspective, the Brave New Legal World bequeathed to us by the Obama
Administration makes Henkin’s impassioned insistence on the self-execution
of most treaties look downright quaint and conservative.

Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1218-19 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1219 n.62.
288 Koh writes:
Even in a Trump presidency, it is a mistake to conclude that the goal of
constitutional interpretation should be to raise the costs of presidential
action in foreign affairs, without regard to issue area. After all, if our
constitutional readings make it harder for the President to make
international deals than to go to war, that legal rigidity will inevitably
shift presidential incentives to rely upon—and overextend—lethal tools
of American hard power instead of deploying our diplomatic, smart
power resources.
Koh, supra note 19, at 364-65.
289 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 45, at 1287-94.
286
287
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C. Desperate Times Calling for Desperate Measures? Footnote Ninety-Two
and the Descent of Harold Koh
I cannot end this tour of the domestic level of the Sources Project without
calling attention to some startling suggestions and calls-to-action made by one
of the Project’s most enthusiastic and influential participants, Harold Koh. As
noted above, the 2016 election of Donald Trump to the Presidency evoked a
measure of consternation in globalist scholarly circles.290 Unlike other
scholars and commentators, however, Koh did not confine his criticism of
President Trump’s nationalistic program to arguments of a purely legal nature.
Instead, he sought to depreciate the importance of the entire class of domestic
actor that President Trump represented, viz. democratically-elected
officialdom. In his early 2017 article published in The Yale Law Journal
Forum, Koh wrote the following:
Most fundamentally, these case studies [the Paris Agreement
and the Iran Nuclear Agreement] remind us that today,
America’s observance of law—both international and
constitutional—is preserved not just by the federal political
branches and those officials who lead them at any particular
time, but by an ongoing transnational legal process whose
diverse stakeholders are not controlled by elected officials.291
Koh then proceeded to identify these stakeholders in a footnote that I refer
to below as “Footnote Ninety-Two”:
These [stakeholders] include: (1) the courts; (2) states and
localities; (3) nongovernmental organizations; (4) formal and
informal media; (5) allies and international organizations; and
(6) a robust federal bureaucracy that has seen many political
leaders come and go. . . . These bureaucrats have myriad ways
of saying “Yes, Minister,” i.e., signaling political obedience,
even while doing their best to continue along the previous
bureaucratic path.292

See supra notes 176-197 and accompanying text.
Koh, supra note 19, at 366; see also id. at 361 (“The key point, as one commentator
put it, is that ‘there is no reason to believe that people will want good health, better
technologies, or clean air less just because of a change in administration . . . .’”) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
292 Id. at 366 n.92.
290
291
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Where to begin? There is certainly nothing wrong with Koh’s first
nominated stakeholder—the judiciary—unless one has in mind litigation of
dubious merit that is designed to harass, delay, or obstruct the elected
government. Koh has indicated that he does embrace this type of litigation
vis-à-vis the Trump Administration.293 Likewise, while there is nothing per se
untoward about seeking to enlist states and localities in a campaign to “hold
America’s [national] leaders accountable for their [international]
commitments,” 294 Koh is arguably the last scholar one would expect to do so.
His international law mentor, Henkin, evinced a rather profound hostility
toward federalism and states’ rights;295 and Koh himself, in his pre-Sosa days
of advocating for the Modern Position, vehemently opposed the intrusion of
state law into areas of international concern.296
The four remaining nominated stakeholders are considerably more
problematic than the first two. Kenneth Anderson and David Rieff have
persuasively explained why NGOs and “civil society”—the globalists’ stock
cure for the democracy deficit at the heart of the international order—are
unlikely to represent any interests but their own (and, I might add, those of
their donors).297 That Koh hopes to enlist the media against the Trump
Administration raises obvious concerns about journalistic integrity and ethics.
That he hopes to enlist foreign countries and international organizations
suggests a lack of concern to protect U.S. political debate and processes from
foreign influence and interference, however ostensibly benign. Finally, his
call to career bureaucrats to stymie the Trump Administration through quiet

293 For example, even though Koh, for good reason, does not appear to think highly of
the chances of success of litigation based on Goldwater v. Carter (see supra note 283), he
advocates for it anyway: “Yet even if a litigation challenge ultimately proved unsuccessful,
the litigation could still last more than a year, thereby pushing the national decision of
whether to complete withdrawal [from the Paris agreement] past Trump’s presidency.”
Koh, supra note 178, at 440.
294 Koh, supra note 19, at 366.
295 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 248, at 344-46.
296 See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824 (1998). An impression of forum-shopping is equally evident in Koh’s eagerness to
bring Congress into the Paris-Agreement picture now that a nationalist occupies the Oval
Office. See supra notes 282-283 and accompanying text.
297 See Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, “Global Civil Society”: A Sceptical View, AM.
U. WASH. COLL. OF L. (Wash. Coll. of L. Research Paper No. 2008-69, 2005), https://ssrn.c
om/abstract=899771; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 50, at 34 (describing international
NGOs as “unaccountable, self-appointed, unrepresentative organizations” that do not
speak “for world public opinion”).
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acts of disobedience298—including, it would seem, intelligence leaks299—may
represent a first in nearly one hundred years of scholarship on the American
administrative state. Historically, the U.S. bureaucracy has been either
criticized for being an undemocratic element in our political system (the
majority view) or praised for being a democratic element (the minority
view).300 Never to my knowledge has it been praised for being an
undemocratic element. It would seem that, in Koh, the “Deep State” has found
its first public apologist.301
With the exception of the states and localities, Koh’s nominated
stakeholders are either wholly politically unaccountable or deeply politically
insulated. And yet it is Koh’s hope that, when combined, their counter-Trump
efforts and advocacy will succeed in draining the Trump Administration of so
much energy and political capital that it will be unable to deliver on President
Trump’s 2016 campaign promises respecting the renegotiation or termination
of certain international agreements.302 How Koh can think this is an
appropriate political tactic in a democratic republic is a bit of a mystery,
although he has left us some clues. He has made note of President Trump’s
“weak coalition, minority electoral support, and limited political capital,”303
indicating, perhaps, a view that the Trump Presidency lacks legitimacy
because then-candidate Trump did not win the popular vote in the 2016
presidential election. Yet surely Koh would recognize the unfairness of such
a position (if in fact he subscribes to it). Presidential candidates campaign in
the way best calculated to win them a majority of votes in the Electoral
College, as that is how victory is determined. To impugn a Presidency because
298 See Koh, supra note 178, at 421 (“U.S. bureaucrats committed to international rules
can continue to pursue a strategy of engage-translate-leverage to maintain default
compliance with existing norms, unless explicitly directed to do otherwise”) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
299 Koh writes approvingly of the fact that “the intelligence community and other parts
of the bureaucracy apparently engaged in unprecedented leaking, providing more grist for
the [anti-Muslim-travel-ban] lawsuits.” Id. at 426 (citation omitted).
300 See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 772 n.163
(2001) (listing scholars who represent each view).
301 In a subsequent 2017 article that contains a near-carbon copy of Footnote NinetyTwo, Koh appears to commend the bureaucrats for what he assumes to be their anti-Trump
bias: “When a country elects a leader that nearly every employee of the State Department,
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of Justice and the Interior has
voted against, those bureaucrats have myriad ways of saying ‘Yes, Minister.’” Koh, supra
note 178, at 465 n.211. It is difficult to know which is worse: the bare fact of Koh’s
assumption or the possibility of its truth. Either way, his hope that the bureaucrats will
work to sabotage the work of a leader “a country elects” makes his past praise of
democracy-promotion policies that are “dedicated to building democracy from the bottom
up” ring horribly hollow. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Future of Lou Henkin’s Human
Rights Movement, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 487, 491 (2007).
302 See Koh, supra note 178, at 421.
303 Koh, supra note 19, at 361.
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it does not rest on a victory in the popular vote is to judge it by a standard that
the President qua candidate never sought to satisfy.
Another possible explanation of Koh’s mindset, which I glean from his
comments on the Trump Administration’s so-called “Muslim travel ban,”304
is that he sees in President Trump Hitleresque tendencies toward the
maltreatment or denigration of minorities. This, I would suggest, is a tough
narrative to sell in light of three things: (1) the Supreme Court’s decisions
upholding the travel ban and a second controversial Trump Administration
immigration-policy directive;305 (2) the Trump Administration’s disinterest to
date in using (as opposed to threatening to use) kinetic warfare as a tool to
advance national interests; and (3) the reality of Trump Administration
policies that are specifically designed to alleviate the plight of formerlyoppressed minority groups.306
A third possible explanation—one that is at once uncomfortable and
necessary to ponder—is that Koh, like a number of other scholars and
commentators in recent years, has lost his regard for the idea of popular
control of government because he has lost faith in the capacity of his fellow
citizens to make sound political, moral, and scientific judgments. 307 If this
third explanation is the correct one, then I would suggest that Koh’s Footnote
Ninety-Two represents nothing so much as a twisted international variation
on the theme of Justice Stone’s Footnote Four to the majority opinion in U.S.
v. Carolene Products Co.308 As is well known, Footnote Four suggests that
electoral democracy in the United States might legitimately be limited for the
sake of preserving the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed expressly or
impliedly by the U.S. Constitution.309 Koh’s apparent variation suggests that
Koh, supra note 178, at 422-30.
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding travel ban); Nielsen v. Preap,
139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (upholding vigorous enforcement of statute requiring deportation of
legal immigrants with criminal records).
306 See, e.g., Josh Lederman, Trump Administration Launches Global Effort to End
Criminalization
of
Homosexuality,
NBC
NEWS
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security-trump-administration-launchesglobal-effort-end-criminalization-on-homosexulaity-n97308; Tucker Higgins, President
Trump Announces His Support for Criminal Justice Reform Legislation, Saying It’s ‘the
Right Thing to Do’, CNBC (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/14/trumpcriminal-justice-reform-legislation-theri
ght-thing-to-do.html.
307 For some revealing examples, see James Traub, It’s Time for the Elites to Rise Up
Against the Ignorant Masses,” FOREIGN POL’Y (June 28, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/
2016/06/28/its-time-for-the-elites-to-rise-up-against-ignorant-masses-trump-2016-brexit/;
Jason Brennan, Brexit, Democracy, and Epistocracy, PRINCETON U. PRESS BLOG (June 24,
2016), https://blog.press.princeton.edu/2016/06/24/ethicist-jason-brennan-brexit-democra
cy-and-epistocracy/.
308 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
309 See id. at 152 n.4. The Court indicated that it would apply a standard of review stricter
than the rational-basis test to legislation that violated a specific provision of the
304
305
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electoral democracy might legitimately be limited—and, if necessary, slyly
subverted—for the sake of resolving certain matters of international concern
on the basis of terms laid down by global “epistemic communities.”310
Faithless bureaucratic agents enlisting in the service of a supranational,
technocratic episteme poses the ultimate counter-majoritarian dilemma. If
ever we were looking for confirmation that we are not in Kansas anymore,
Koh’s Footnote Ninety-Two is probably it.
IV. PART III: HOW DO THEY JUSTIFY IT?
The effort to understand how Koh justifies his advocacy of extreme
methods to frustrate a newly-elected Presidency prompts similar, if larger,
questions regarding the justifications offered by globalist legal scholars for
the Sources Project as a whole. At the outset of this study we encountered
Charney’s nominated justification, viz. certain urgent matters of global
concern have put state consent as the source of international legal obligation
out of humanity’s price range.311 It now seems appropriate, as a final matter,
to turn a critical eye on this justification as well as on others put forward over
the years. My aim is not so much to present a comprehensive critique as to
offer a few trenchant remarks capable of prompting, perhaps, a
reconsideration of long-held assumptions and positions.
A. “We Can’t Afford the Consent Principle”
Let us begin with Charney’s justification. It began life as a powerful
narrative: Extreme times beget extreme measures. Aside from one or two
slips-of-the-tongue,312 Charney presented the new coercive international
power as a carefully delimited one that would be exercised in only a small
number of extreme cases.313 Charney’s list was famously restricted to bigticket items like transnational environmental threats, international terrorism,
war crimes, and grievous intra-state atrocities (e.g. apartheid or genocide).314
We have seen, however, how the new, coercive CIL that developed in the
wake of Charney’s proposal is capable of attaching to virtually any treaty or
resolution irrespective of the gravity, urgency or transnational nature of the
Constitution, compromised the functioning of democratic processes, or targeted with
prejudicial action discrete and insular minorities.
310 See Koh, supra note 19, at 364-65 (noting that international law and institutions are
currently developed “less through formal devices, and more through repeated dialogues
within epistemic communities of international lawyers working for diverse governments
and nongovernmental institutions.”).
311 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
312 See supra note 86.
313 Charney, supra note 13, at 530.
314 Id.
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activity addressed.315 No apparent thresholds need be met. Moreover, the
recent attempts to re-cast treaties as permanent commitments that are offlimits to domestic politics have not differentiated between treaties that address
the most urgent global concerns and those that do not.316 If such attempts
continue into the future, this omission may prove as negatively consequential
for sovereignty as the CIL development just noted. The bottom line is that
however sincere Charney may have been in assuring the world that the new
international power would be used conservatively, his intent has not been
honored by his academic colleagues or by the international lawyers who man
important positions in Koh’s “epistemic communities.” Somewhere along the
line, the expression “urgent global threat” lost the words “urgent” and
“threat,” to become just “global.” This is a problem—if not for Charney, then
certainly for sovereigntists.
Regrettably, this is not the only way in which the “we can’t afford state
consent” rationale has been deployed disingenuously. I noted in the
introduction my belief, subscribed to by others, that international power
structures are undemocratic because they lack the accountability mechanisms
that ensure popular control of government.317 If this belief is correct, the
argument that we can no longer afford state sovereignty and consent entails
the argument that we can no longer afford democracy. Yet this grim
consequence is seldom if ever admitted to by globalist legal scholars, either
because they contest it and claim instead to have reconciled democracy with
global governance,318 or more commonly because they ignore it and hope for
the best.319 Their lack of candor matters because if the global public
understood that globalization would cost them something as precious as
democratic governance, they might assess more critically than they have
heretofore those big-ticket items on Charney’s list, as well as the other
rationales that have been advanced to justify globalization. Students of
political philosophy well understand that authoritarian rule is often sold on the
basis of an assumption of a deeply flawed and dangerous “state of nature.”
But posit a congenial state of nature, or one marked by inconveniences that
are fairly easily fixed or contained, and the need for an autocrat—technocratic
and NGO-flavored or otherwise—disappears. We find ourselves tossing out
our Hobbes and reaching for our Locke. The point is that people have little
incentive to question the globalists’ depictions of the pre-globalized world—
the “state of nature,” if you will—if they are unaware that the solution being
offered is of an authoritarian kind. Give them that awareness, and they are
See supra Part I.A.ii.
See supra Part I.B.i.
317 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
318 See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 172.
319 From what he has written, it would appear that Stephan encountered this Panglossian
attitude on the part of his colleagues during the late 1990s. See supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
315
316
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then more likely to employ the scrutiny needed to make informed choices
productive of efficient outcomes.320
Examples in this regard are not hard to come by. Barbara Stark, among
others, has urged congressional ratification of the ICESCR on the grounds that
it “assures a safety net for those most vulnerable to the vagaries of global
capitalism.”321 Her use of the word “vagaries” is interesting, as it suggests that
economic crises and dislocations are as inevitable and unpreventable as
natural disasters. And since natural disasters do not respect national
boundaries, an international solution—in the form of a human rights
instrument—would seem to be necessary. However, what if global
capitalism’s vagaries are not the equivalent of a tornado or volcanic eruption
but instead are the product of a specific school of scholarly thought, viz. neoliberal economics?322 And what if a different economic approach—a more
protective or “Hamiltonian” one, say323—could put an end to those vagaries,
or at least significantly blunt them?324 There would then be considerably less
need for international socio-economic intervention in the form of the
ICESCR, as well as for the kind of comprehensive global financial
management provided by the Basel-based Bank of International
Settlements.325 Similar logic can be applied to the issue of cross-border mass
migration. This, too, is often portrayed as a quasi-natural phenomenon that
can be treated by international means but not effectively prevented. Yet what
if this portrayal is inaccurate? If, for example, the ongoing mass migration out
of the Middle East and northern Africa is the result of a misguided Western
policy of humanitarian bombing and regime-change, as I have argued
elsewhere,326 the solution, it would seem, is straightforward: End that policy.
Only then will we be in a position to know whether the Global Migration
320 By “efficient” I mean outcomes that achieve the greatest gain in collective
management of genuine transborder problems for the least amount of loss of democratic
sovereignty.
321 Stark, supra note 12, at 126.
322 Neo-liberal economics tends to prioritize unfettered market relations, endorse the
dominance of capital over labor, and remain agnostic when it comes to assessing the merits
of financialized, as opposed to productive, forms of capitalism. See DAVID M. KOTZ, THE
RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM (2017).
323 For background on the economic policies of Alexander Hamilton and his intellectual
disciple Henry Clay, see Andrew Spannaus, The Roots of Trump’s ‘Economic
Nationalism’,
CONSORTIUM
NEWS
(Apr.
13,
2017),
https://consortiumnews.com/2017/04/13/rootsof-trumps-economic-nationalism/.
324 This would appear to be the rationale behind President Trump’s tariff policy. See
Tyler Durden, Trump Is Working to Change the Way Economists View Tariffs,
ZEROHEDGE (May 10, 2019), https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-05-10/trumpworking-changeway-economists-view-tariffs.
325 For background on the seemingly hierarchical relationship between the Bank of
International Settlements and U.S. Federal Reserve, see Benjamin, supra note 50, at 3541.
326 See Benjamin, supra notes 229-230.
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Compact and the CIL likely to develop out of it 327 are truly necessary and
worth the loss of democratic sovereignty they entail.
The final problem with the “we can’t afford state consent” rationale is the
technocratic hubris that sometimes accompanies it. It goes without saying that
the call for coerced compliance with internationally crafted solutions would
lack normative force unless it presumed solutions of high merit. State dissent
and self-exclusion from flawed international approaches would hardly be
cause for concern. Yet this logic can tempt the global “epistemic
communities” to overstate the virtues of their agreed agendas. The Paris
Agreement arguably serves as a case in point here. While President Trump
believes Paris to represent merely a solution to the problem of climate
change—and an extremely baleful one at that for the United States328—Paris
proponents, eager to quash any suggestion of renegotiation, denounced the
President’s withdrawal decision as though he had walked away from the
solution.329 Their reaction was understandable given that their aim was
universal adherence. Yet given the subject matter—not genocide or
aggression, which admit of only one correct response,330 but a highly complex
regulatory challenge that is not only amenable to different approaches of an
honest kind but also vulnerable to corrupt capture—one would think they
might have reconsidered that aim. Instead, they doubled down and insisted
that their handiwork was immune to any reasonable criticism.
B. “The Consent Principle Never Really Existed . . . Much.”
If Charney had said, in effect, “we can’t afford state consent,” other
globalist scholars, writing in his wake and perhaps not wanting to leave
anything to chance, have advanced a second argument that boils down to this:
‘The consent principle never really existed—at least not to the extent so often
claimed—and we therefore should not be bothered by the fact that consent is
increasingly dishonored as the key organizing principle of international

See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
In explaining his withdrawal decision, the President expressed the view that an
unacknowledged secondary agenda of wealth-transfer from West to East lay behind the
Paris remediation scheme. See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord
(White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/br
iefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
329 See, e.g., Kalina Oroschacoff, Jean-Claude Juncker: No Renegotiation of Paris
Climate Deal, POLITICO (June 14, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/jean-claudejuncker-no-renegotiation-of-paris-climate-deal/ (documenting Juncker’s dismissal, as “a
distraction,” of the Trump Administration’s offer to renegotiate the terms of the Paris
Agreement).
330 Along the lines of “Stop Now!”
327
328
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law.’331 For such scholars, the voluntarist conception of international law—
under which international legal rules bind states only if they have expressly
or impliedly agreed to them—is more or less a fiction, and an annoying fiction
at that. Green, whom I have characterized as a mild globalist,332 writes for
many when he states:
[T]he voluntarist theory of international law is itself riddled
with theoretical holes. . . . [T]he present author rejects the
voluntarist understanding of international law, at least in its
absolute form. It is observable social fact that binding
international law is not always derived from state will. The
“tortured legal process” of rooting the binding force of
international law in the consent of states is both well known
and commonly glossed over. . . . Ultimately, voluntarism is
“plagued by contradictions” in relation to international law in
general and customary international law in particular.333
Green delivers this judgment with conviction, yet he also makes points and
concessions that undermine it. He recognizes, for example, that the ICJ, since
the 1927 decision of its predecessor court in the Lotus Case, has consistently
endorsed voluntarism334 and that, no doubt as a consequence, voluntarism
“remains the orthodoxy in modern doctrine.” 335 He also acknowledges that
states—which he describes as “the primary actors in international law”336—
are resolutely voluntarist in their approach to the rules that would bind them.
He writes:
States rarely accept the binding force of norms that they have
not consented to . . . . If customary international law is
something that can be imposed on states in the face of their
expressed dissent, then it would likely be perceived by them
as an illegitimate attack on sovereign autonomy.337

331 As noted above, Charney himself briefly flirted with this argument before conceding
that state consent was a reality that needed to be overcome. See supra notes 54-56, 63-67
and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
333 GREEN, supra note 42, at 246, 250 (citations omitted).
334 See id. at 240.
335 Id. at 241.
336 Id. at 260.
337 Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 254 (“Rejecting voluntarism as a ‘perfect’ account
of international law’s binding force does not mean that the will of individual states should
no longer be seen as a crucial element of international law-making.”) (citation omitted). It
will be recalled that Charney, too, conceded that states were voluntarist in their outlook.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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One can be forgiven for wondering how the voluntarist conception can be
flawed if the primary actors of the international community, as well as the
foremost international adjudicative body, subscribe to it. Here we enter the
realm of speculation, but I suspect the answer lies somewhere in the folds of
a persistent belief on the part of globalist scholars and their IGO/NGO allies
that they simply know better. This is not to say that such scholars and allies
have not advanced specific arguments in support of their anti-voluntarist
position. They most certainly have. Yet those arguments, taken as a whole,
are so lacking in logic and substance as to suggest that the position is more
article-of-faith than anything else. A quick canvass will suffice to demonstrate
my point.
One argument advanced is that states are not fully voluntarist all of the
time. Instead, they “grudgingly accept—in practice if not explicitly—that
international law is non-voluntarist at times” 338 and “respond to the
‘compliance pull’ of international law even when it is against their direct
interests to do so.” 339 But do they really? I would suggest this argument is far
too jejune by half, for it ignores the very real possibility that states distinguish
between their near- and long-term self-interests and occasionally willingly
sacrifice the former to the latter. Indeed, there is nothing strange or rare about
a state agreeing to an international rule it dislikes, and would otherwise refuse
its consent to, in the hope that such agreement will secure for it other states’
cooperation on different matters going forward. And when such a state
strategically trades its “quid” for other states’ “quos,” it is no more correct to
say that it has been coerced than to say that a legislator is coerced when she
engages in logrolling in the halls of Congress.
A second argument purporting to show that voluntarism is a fiction focuses
on, and makes much of, two narrow categories of primary rules that govern
the conduct of states: jus cogens norms and “the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.”340 With regard to the former, it is often
observed that states may not opt out of norms of jus cogens via persistent
objection (pre-crystallization) or treaty-making (post-crystallization). This is
true. Yet I would argue that this lack of opt-out rights signifies but a minute
element of coercion given that (a) these norms are extremely few in number;
and (b) near-universal acceptance of a norm (i.e. near-universal state consent)
GREEN, supra note 42, at 260 (citation omitted).
Id. at 258 (citation omitted).
340 For “general principles,” see ICJ Statute art. 38(1)(c). These principles are usually
taken to include basic norms of procedural fairness (e.g., the principle of res judicata) and
of substantive equity (e.g., the doctrine of “unclean hands”). Of them Green writes:
It is almost impossible to situate the application of such principles as law,
binding on states, in a voluntarist account of the system; . . . [T]he idea
that such principles have been derived from all—or even most—
domestic systems would be an obvious fiction.
GREEN, supra note 42, at 247 (citations omitted).
338
339
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is required before a norm can even acquire the status of jus cogens. As Green
concedes, if jus cogens is a form of natural law, then it is natural law firmly
grounded in voluntarism.341 As for the vaunted “general principles,” these are
applied coercively only in the context of international adjudication, which
itself is a rare and often consensual phenomenon. Even in that context they
are applied only sparingly.342 I leave it to the reader to decide whether a
coercive and substantively thick world order can be justified—even
partially—on the basis of such seldom and minor applications of law. For my
own part I think it reasonably clear that involuntary state submission to, say,
the principle of res judicata entails an infinitesimal insult to sovereignty
compared to involuntary state submission to first order rule regimes like the
Global Migration Compact or the ATT.
The third argument against the reality of voluntarism relates to the
assertedly coercive nature of traditional CIL. To the extent the argument is
simply that tacit consent, through knowing and voluntary inaction, is not the
same thing as explicit consent, through affirmative words or conduct, we are
in the land of the obvious and the unremarkable: Tacit and express consent
are self-evidently different sociological phenomena.343 That said, it is also true
that both types of consent are capable of protecting a state from coercion. Even
the most benighted teenager understands the difference between being told
she must accompany her family to dinner regardless of her wishes and being
told she must accompany her family to dinner unless she objects in timely
fashion to going. “You will do X unless you speak up” is a wonderfully
meaningful ticket to freedom when compared to “You will do X, period.” And
even the most benighted teenager understands that she cannot hope to garner
much sympathy if she dissents but does not speak up. What holds for nuclear
families holds also for the family of nations: Silent dissenters have only
themselves to blame.

341 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 213-14 (“Peremptory norms may not require universal
acceptance, but they do require near-universal acceptance. . . . Jus cogens norms are, or at
least should be, natural law rules under careful positivist guard”) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted). It is helpful to recall that the source of twentieth-century naturalism—
the Nuremberg judgments—were the product of an exceedingly positivistic adjudication.
Allied prosecutors relied on German treaty commitments, not natural law, to indict on
crimes against peace and war crimes. See MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR
CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46, 229-30 (1997). The indictment’s sole natural law count—crimes
against humanity—drew much publicity but ultimately proved a juridical dead-end in that
litigation. See id. at 250.
342 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 247 (noting “the rare occasions when the ICJ has applied
general principles”).
343 Green suggests this argument when he writes: “The notion of state silence as
constituting consent for the formation of custom is difficult to reconcile with conceptions
of genuine consent. This is not least because ‘consent’ and ‘absence of dissent’ are, quite
simply, different things.” Id. at 248 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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This undoubtedly is why globalist scholars have tended to quickly pivot
from minimizing the value (to dissenters) of tacit consent to denying its very
possibility.344 Over the years they have drawn our attention repeatedly to the
plight of the unaware state, the not-yet-formed state, and the state that realizes
its disagreement with a norm only after the point of norm-crystallization—all
in an effort to demonstrate an allegedly pervasive inability on the part of states
to object when they would otherwise wish to.345 But this tired litany of cases
is not nearly as probative as globalists would have us believe. Consider that
such states’ inability to object translates into negative legal consequences for
their sovereignty only owing to the extremely unforgiving rules of persistent
objection that globalist scholars themselves have insisted on.346 What Charney
stated apropos the norms of jus cogens applies to these rules as well: They are
not handed down by God but rather are the product of very human
argumentation and behavior.347 Take away the onerous restrictions on
unilateral exemption from CIL, as canvassed and criticized above,348 and the
voluntarists’ “problem” of uninformed and involuntary state silence melts
away. Conversely, lobby for those restrictions to remain in place whilst citing
them as evidence of an objectively non-voluntarist world order, and the only
prize you deserve to win is the one given out for advanced intellectual
bootstrapping.
A somewhat different argument involving the persistent-objector
exemption holds not that the exemption disserves voluntarism but that its
actual original purpose was to diminish voluntarism’s space. This apparently
was the view of mid-twentieth-century British scholars Humphrey Waldock
and Michael Akehurst, who saw the exemption as a way to make it easier for
binding CIL rules to become established.349 The logic of their position was
nicely restated in 2000 by a committee of the International Law Association
when it noted that, in cases where support for a new CIL norm is widespread,
the exemption ensures that “the convoy of law’s progressive development can
move forward without having to wait for the slowest vessel.”350 But casting
the persistent-objector exemption as the facilitator of a coercive international
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., id.
346 See supra Part I.A.iii. Green himself argues sternly against excusing these three types
of states from the persistent-objector rule’s timeliness requirement. See GREEN, supra note
42, at 162-79. For my comment on his general refusal to countenance subsequent objection
for any reason, see supra note 160.
347 See Charney, supra note 13, at 542 (“Today, few suggest that jus cogens norms
emanate from some deity. Rather, they are the product of human actions, including
argumentation and behavior.”).
348 See supra Part I.A.iii.
349 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 236-38.
350 INT’L LAW ASSOC., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF
GENERAL CUSTOMARY LAW, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONFERENCE REPORT (London 2000), at 28.
344
345
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order has always been a tough sell. Charney, for one, did not buy it. “[I]t is
difficult to see,” he wrote in 1985, “how the acceptance of this rule does not
reflect an acceptance of the consent theory of international law.”351 He was
right, albeit for reasons that have not always been cleanly stated in the
literature. Here then, briefly, is why:
The explosion of new states that attended decolonization following World
War II posed a problem for the old rules of CIL-formation. Uniformity of state
practice—something the cozy club of imperial European powers had come
both to expect and regard as a quasi-requirement of custom—was not likely
to characterize the newly-emerging, highly diverse community of states.352
But recognizing that unanimity was no longer likely to occur was the easy
part; deciding how dissenters would be dealt with going forward, the hard
part. Two options presented themselves, albeit somewhat inchoately. The
first, which as we know ultimately gained traction in the 1980s with scholars
like Charney,353 was to coerce dissenters by outvoting them with prejudice.
The second, favored by Western powers concerned about being outvoted by
the more numerous states of the emerging Third World/Global South, was to
give dissenters a means of escape.354 But through their earlier introduction of
the Mandatory View during the years 1890-1920,355 those same Western
powers had put an end to the broad exit rights that had characterized pretwentieth century CIL.356 Escape would therefore have to come in the form of
a pre-crystallization right of exit. Hence the genesis of the modern persistentobjector exemption. I submit that nothing other than concern to safeguard the
consent principle can explain why the pre-World War II tendency toward
unanimous custom gave way, not to majority rule (as it might have), but to
the narrow escape hatch of persistent objection.
C. “The Consent Principle Is Undemocratic and/or an Affront to State
Autonomy.”
The third main justification of the Sources Project that courses through the
literature is nothing if not ambitious. It takes the fight right to the heart of the
consent principle by arguing that voluntarism is undemocratic and/or an
affront to state autonomy. It is undemocratic, allegedly, because it allows a
tiny minority of states—indeed, perhaps even a single state—to frustrate the
351 Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 16 (1985). It will come as no surprise to
readers to learn that once Charney (correctly) identified the persistent-objector exemption
as his enemy, he set about to discredit it. See Charney, supra note 13, at 538-42.
352 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 232-33.
353 See supra Introduction & Part I.A.i.
354 See GREEN, supra note 42, at 261.
355 See supra note 61.
356 See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 41, at 215-26.
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agenda of a majority of states.357 It is an affront to state autonomy, again
allegedly, because autonomy demands that a state have the “positive” ability
to impose constraints on other states’ behavior via collective international
action.358 Fortunately, we need not tarry long with either argument.
The “democracy” argument is superficially appealing but rests on a
spurious analogy between the domestic and international political orders.
Recall the basic truism as to why majority rule is tolerable in the first place:
“We are willing to live under laws we oppose, provided that we have a fair
opportunity to repeal or amend them.”359 In other words, the minority—be it
of states or of individuals—accepts the tyranny-of-the-majority today because
it hopes to become the majority tomorrow. Absent that possibility, majority
rule is as dictatorial a form of rule as hereditary monarchy. The question, then,
is whether dissenting states, and their citizenries, have a fair opportunity to
change international rules they oppose. The answer is plainly no, at least not
to an extent we would consider remotely acceptable on the domestic level. For
the possibility of change depends on the existence of a culture of democratic
politics (i.e. an environment in which multitudinous acts of political
communication, for the purpose of remonstrance and persuasion, can and do
take place). If a conservative Missourian chafes under “leftish” laws passed
by a Democrat-controlled Congress, she can avail herself of a common
language and common political parties nationwide to win her fellow citizens
over to her views, achieve a change in the representational makeup of
Congress in the next election, and thereby secure a change in the laws she
dislikes. If, on the other hand, the citizenries of Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic overwhelming oppose a “leftish” open-borders agenda
animating a (hypothetical) majority-imposed global migration compact, they
have no realistic way of seeking out and winning over other national
citizenries even within the European Union, let alone worldwide. The various
communities of the world do not speak the same languages, nor necessarily
have similar political parties.360 Yes, their national government
representatives can speak with other national government representatives in
357 Joel Trachtman writes: “The requirement of consent or unanimity-based decisionmaking cannot be defended by reference to democracy. . . . This can easily be seen where
a single small state has the capacity to block decisions that are desired by the overwhelming
majority of states.” Joel P. Trachtman, Reports of the Death of Treaty Are Premature, But
Customary International Law May Have Outlived Its Usefulness, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 36,
39 (2014).
358 See id. (“Assuming for a moment that a state has equal interests in avoiding constraints
on its behavior and procuring constraints on other states’ behavior, then any voting rule
should be equally attractive compared to any other voting rule.”).
359 Andrew C. McCarthy, Obama’s Judges Continue Thwarting Trump, NAT’L REV.
(Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/obama-appointed-lawyers-thw
art-trump-policies-immigration-energy/.
360 Nor, I might add, do they have a shared past, which goes some way toward softening
the blow of losing any given round of electoral politics.
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the halls of IGOs. But unless those other national governments are elected via
democratic processes, and unless the Polish, Hungarian and Czech
governments, as well as their citizenries, can access and participate in those
processes, effecting changes of position and votes in the IGOs is unlikely. And
without that real possibility of change, majority rule is like an elegant hand
fitted with brass knuckles. If the consent principle stands in the way of such a
hand coming down, that is a good thing, not a bad thing, is it not?
The “autonomy” argument may or may not be defensible, depending on
the breadth with which it is pitched. If taken to mean that a state is not fully
free unless it can constrain any and all types of behavior on the part of other
states, it rests on a conception of freedom that is alien to a good portion of the
Western political tradition and conducive to empire building, not state
sovereignty. If, on the other hand, the argument is taken to mean that a state
is not fully free unless it can protect itself from the harmful behavior of others,
it is undoubtedly correct; for both individuals and states, being left in peace is
the essence of negative liberty. That is why we have police forces at the
domestic level and collective security at the international. However, beyond
justifying laws and institutions that protect states from the harmful activity of
aggressive war, it is unclear how much globalization this version of the
autonomy argument can support. I have argued, for example, that it cannot
sustain that portion of the modern human rights movement which targets
intrastate malfeasance.361 I have also suggested why, apropos negativeexternality-producing behavior, it cannot justify international solutions that
are either unnecessary or substantively flawed.362 At the end of the day, if the
world had only that quantum of international law that the autonomy argument
could support, it would have considerably less international law than it has
now. And that, I submit, would be a very good thing indeed.
V. CONCLUSION
There was nothing inevitable about the Sources Project. We know this
because we can rather easily imagine a world governed by secondary rules
different from the ones it has promoted. Consider a world in which the
following rules and principles obtain:
• If a state declines to ratify a treaty (or reserves to a part thereof),
it remains legally exempt from any subsequently arising identical
CIL until such time as it clearly indicates an intent to be bound by
it (via words or deeds). This rule reflects the ICJ’s approach in
North Sea and effectively puts an end to Sheepdogging.
• An expression of normative opinio juris contained in a resolution
does not mature into binding CIL simply because states begin to
361
362

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 317-330 and accompanying text.
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act in conformity with it. For aspirational norms to transition into
legal norms, evidence of genuine descriptive opinio juris must be
found to exist. This rule effectively puts an end to Fake Custom.
NSAs are at most “finders” of CIL. If they find it irresponsibly
(i.e. from a posture of advocacy), they are to be criticized, not
elevated to the status of CIL “makers.” The opinio juris of NSAs
can never give rise to new CIL of its own force, and states lose no
rights by failing to respond to it. These rules effectively put an
end to Funhouse CIL.
A single, formally-stated objection to an evolving CIL norm is
enough to establish a state’s exemption from that norm. Once
established, the exemption continues until such time as a state
clearly abandons it (via words or deeds). The burden of proof is
on those alleging abandonment. Subsequent objection- and-exit is
available, with immediate effect, from any CIL norm that does not
implicate significant reliance interests (e.g. human rights norms).
It is available from norms implicating significant reliance
interests pending the running of an adequate notice period. These
rules align CIL-withdrawal rights with treaty-withdrawal rights,
meaningfully preserve the element of state consent in CILformation, and safeguard state sovereignty over intra-state
matters.
The international order exists to serve the needs of individual
states, not vice versa. This means that treaty commitments are not
presumed to be permanent and that international actors have a
duty to respect and be solicitous of domestic constitutional
processes. This principle effectively puts an end to the gimmicks
and tricks discussed in Part I.B.ii.
In the United States, the federal judiciary enforces (as federal
common law) only those CIL norms that are authorized by the
Constitution or endorsed by Congress. Consequently, CIL norms
that derive from treaties that Congress has refused to ratify or
implement are judicially unenforceable. There is a general
presumption against the self-execution of treaties, and this
presumption is heightened in the case of Senate-only ratified
treaties that concern intra-state matters. These rules reflect and
expand upon the spirit of the holdings in Sosa and Medellin.
Ex ante congressional authorization of international agreements
negotiated by the President must be specific and genuine, not
extrapolated, implied or manufactured. If the President seeks to
implement an international political commitment via legally
binding domestic regulations, he must first obtain formal
approval of that commitment from Congress. These rules
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effectively put an end to Executive Agreements+, Fake
Authorization, Henkin’s Revenge, and Secret Henkin’s Revenge.
If these proposed rules and principles strike us as outdated and even a tad
outlandish, it is not because they lack internal consistency or logic. It is
because we have been conditioned to believe that the phenomenon they
protect—state sovereignty—disserves humanity. But if that conditioning is
false, if sovereignty serves humanity by ensuring that political decisions are
taken at a level close enough to the People that the People might reasonably
hope to influence them, then these rules and principles take on an entirely
different hue. They become indispensable and, I would suggest, the only
moral way forward. While Koh has invoked the film Casablanca in promising
his fellow globalists that “we’ll always have Paris,”363 my nomination for best
picture in the category of international law is and can only be . . . Back to the
Future.

363

Koh, supra note 178, at 442.

